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In the global economy, all competitors had capital, technology, and 
competence. The major variables that affected a company's competitive 
viability were governmental policy and people. 
Participative management schemes that were being espoused by 
management and leadership gurus, such as Tom Peters and Peter Drucker 
were all based on the premise that people were the competitive advantage 
in today's marketplace. It was further stated by many employee 
involvement disciples that if management chose not to utilize this 
strength, American industry would not be the leader in the world 
economic community. 
Most companies which were achieving acceptable results were not 
particularly interested in changing their ways. According to Ralph 
Barra, "we are great at maintenance management and happy with small 
improvements." Participative management is a method of obtaining larger 
improvements (Pennar, 1988, p. 101). 
Statement of the Problem 
Many successful large companies were not generally implementing 
participative management methods. The current management literature was 
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replete with unsubstantiated claims that participative management and 
employee involvement were the keys to increasing productivity. 
The problem which gave rise to this study was the inadequacy of 
research which established that participative management and employee 
involvement systems contribute to increased productivity. 
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this study was to compare the levels of performance 
of employee involvement teams to those of traditionally supervised 
employees doing the same work. 
Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis was that there was no significant difference 
between the levels of performance of employee involvement teams and 
those of traditionally supervised employees performing electronic 
assembly operations at a major manufacturing facility. 
Limitations 
The study contained the following limitations. 
1. The population used for this study was limited to occupational 
employees of a major electronics assembly plant located in Oklahoma. 
2. Subjects for training were selected by management and the 
selection was based on total group populations, areas, and status 
against production schedules. 
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3. Actual participation by the subjects in team activity was 
voluntary. 
4. Training of subjects was mandatory. 
5. The downsizing of management was implemented during the study 
period. 
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6. Experts claimed that a five to ten year implementation period 
was required for employee participation to be fruitful (Dumaine, 1990). 
7. Constraints were present in union contractual areas and in the 
personnel areas because the study was conducted in a union environment. 
8. Management support, or non-support, was not evaluated during the 
study. 
Assumptions 
The subjects who volunteered to make up the employee involvement 
teams were interested in successfuly implementing this new workplace 
approach. 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms were used in this study: 
Computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) - Computer aided design 
(CAD) and computer aided manufacturing (CAM) linked in a system that 
manages data flow while directing the movement and processing of 
material. A manufacturing system that integrates the resources that are 
required for value added manufacturing, ie., people, material, capital 
and information into a production process that operates in a real-time 
environment. 
Continuous in-line manufacturing (CIM) -A production process that 
utilizes the principles of computer-integrated manufacturing. A 
continuous in-line process begins a task at the input station and a 
finished product comes out of the process at the "end of the line" 
without any manual material handling intervention by factors outside of 
the planned process. 
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Employee involvement (EI) - A system of managing people, structures 
and systems that allow for a level of participation, as viewed from an 
employee perspective. (Participative management is the same thing but 
viewed from a management perspective.) 
Just-in-time production (JIT) - A philosophy that focuses attention 
on the elimination of waste. In a broad sense it is the elimination of 
waste by purchasing or manufacturing just enough of the right items just 
in time, since material is the major cost associated with high 
technology goods. 
Kaizen {A Japanese word.) -The cornerstone of the Japanese 
production process which is based on continuous improvement and 
involving everyone in the process. 
Kanban (A Japanese word.) -A manual inventory control procedure 
developed by Toyota that uses cards to keep inventory status highly 
visible and that manages production so that necessary units are made in 
the necessary quantities at the necessary time. 
Keiretsu (A Japanese word.) -Japanese business alliances between 
companies in the same field and across all economic sectors of their 
economy. 
Total guality control (TOC) -A strongly held belief that errors, 
if any, should be caught and corrected at the source, not at the end of 
the process. 
Organization of the Study 
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There was a need for more empirical evidence about the effects of 
employee involvement systems upon the financial and every-day results of 
business enterprises. Chapter I was the introductory chapter and 
contained sections which related to the reasons that empirical evidence 
was required. Chapter I also included the statement of the problem, the 
purpose of the study, the hypothesis, the limitations of the study, the 
assumptions of the study and definitions of specific terms used in the 
study. 
Chapter II presented literature about employee involvement systems, 
both positive and negative. This chapter also evaluated various 
approaches and environments that were required to inaugurate employee 
involvement systems. 
Chapter III included the procedures that were used in the study, 
the population, the instrumentation, and an explanation of how the data 
were analyzed. 
The findings were presented in Chapter IV. 
Chapter V consisted of the summary of the study, conclusions based 
upon the study results, recommendations for practice, recommendations 
for further research, and implications of the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
No discussion of productivity or employee involvement systems can 
take place without a comprehensive look at the factors that influence 
the way business operates in the global economy and in the United 
States. This chapter evaluated the different environmental factors that 
affect our cquntry's capability to compete and established and discussed 
the methodology and approaches that were required to initiate employee 
involvement systems in workplaces, assuming that these employee 
involvement approaches had merit. 
Since the dawn of creation, the human race had survived as a 
species and prospered because it could adapt to change. Wantuck (1989) 
believed that this same adaptability would be required if the United 
States was to succeed in the global market. Americans no longer enjoy 
the world's highest standard of living and have ranked last among the 
industrialized nations in the rate of productivity growth (Grazier, 
1989). 
Grazier (1989) claimed that most businesses were profitable and 
successful and believed that most Americans had enjoyed a reasonably 
comfortable standard of living. Because of that, he believed that there 
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was no motivation to change the way people worked and behaved in our 
society. 
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Hoerr (1989) stated that if the United States was to become a 
world-class manufacturing nation, companies must produce in small lots 
and must customize products to increasingly unique demands. This 
approach called for flexible work practices and workers who were willing 
to shift from job to job. 
The study evaluated the different interdependent variables 
associated with employee involvement and participation programs and 
presented different approaches that were utilized in implementation. 
The work concentrated on the manufacturing sector, but the lessons 
learned could be applied to other sectors of the economy as well. 
Overall Environment 
According to Peters (1990), 46% of the Fortune 500 companies 
dropped out of this elite group during the last decade, and the same 
could be expected for the 1990's. Peters wrote that speed and time 
management were required in order to compete. Slow responses in today's 
economic climate resulted in loss of market share and quality was no 
longer a strategic advantage or selling point. 
Peters believed that leadership was about emotion, not 
administration. Taylor's theories and stop-watches were out. The 
workplace must become a university in order for business to survive, and 
business will win based upon employee brains, not muscle, because 
machines would do 90% of the work (Peters, 1990). 
Naisbitt (1990) forecasted a resurgence of art, literature, 
humanities and a spiritual new Renaissance. He believed that our human 
resources could be the competitive edge for the United States. 
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"The most successful corporations of the 1990's might be something 
called \learning organizations,' a consummately adaptive enterprise in 
which free workers, freed to think for themselves, can identify 
opportunities and problems which they are free to solve themselves. The 
manager of tomorrow must be able to get people to commit themselves to 
the business" (Dumaine, 1989, p. 49). 
Dumaine (1989) stated that the key issue would be empowerment, a 
term whose strength suggested the need to get beyond merely sharing a 
little information and a bit of decision-making authority. 
The Human Resource 
Nussbaum (1988) stated that the nation's ability to compete was 
threatened by inadequate investment in our most important resource: 
people. Ehrlich and Garland (1988) believed that too many workers 
lacked skills to perform more demanding jobs, and as the economy came to 
depend more and more on minorities, the United States faced a massive 
job of education and training, starting with kindergarten. 
Tomorrow's pool of available workers will be smaller and 
underprepared in basic workplace skills. The labor demographics will be 
characterized by more women, older persons, more disadvantaged, and more 
minority workers. The Educational Testing Service reported that "the 
nation's youth have reached a minimum standard of literacy but few can 
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use this knowledge and skill for thoughtful or problem solving purposes" 
(Baker, 1989, p. 17) . 
Nussbaum (1988) best summarized the situation facing the American 
economy in the coming years: 
Take a trip back to what may be our future. It is the 1851 
Industrial Exibition at the Crystal Palace in London. Britain is 
the dominant world power. The U.S. is No.2 in industry and catching 
up fast. Made in America reapers, muskets, and tools are the 
marvels of the show. British businessmen are amazed at what they 
see. Products are assembled from completely interchangeable parts. 
Here is true mass production for the first time. So impressed are 
they that they name it 'the American system of manufacture.' 
Worried delegations of British industrialists set sail to 
investigate. Their findings? American manufacturing prowess is in 
large part due to a highly educated workforce. The Yankees have an 
astonishing high literacy rate of 90% among the free population. 
In the industrial heartland of New England, 95% of the adults read 
and write. In contrast, just two-thirds of the people in Britain 
are literate. 
Now zip ahead a century or so to the 1980's. The U.S. is the 
dominant world power, and it is Japan that is No.2 and closing 
fast. America's CEO's marvel at the quality of Japanese products 
flooding their markets. They make pilgrimages to Tokyo. Their 
findings? Manufacturing superiority is being forfeited to the 
Japanese. And yes, once again, behind the success lies a better 
educated workforce. In 1988, Japan's functional literacy rate is 
better than 95%. In America it's down to about 80% (Nussbaum, 
1988, p. 101). 
Enhancing human capital needed to be a national priority. 
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According to Nussbaum (1988), the evidence was overwhelming that people, 
not machines were the driving force behind economic growth. In the 
period from 1948 to 1982, the nation's GNP increased at an annual rate 
of 3.2%. Edward Dennison, an expert in growth economies, found that 
one-third of that gain was caused by the increase in the educational 
level of the United States workforce and about half the growth was the 
result of technological innovation and increased know-how, which also 
depend on education. But just 15% of the total increase was the result 
of more capital equipment (Nussbaum, 1988). 
"For the past several decades, we have scurried to find jobs for 
people," said John Sloan Jr., president of the National Federation of 
Independent Business. "In the future, we will scurry to find people for 
the jobs" (Kelley, 1989, p. 1). This shortfall was not due to the 
decrease in population and participation rates, but to the deficiency in 
skills available to fill the more technologically advanced new jobs that 
are being created (Kelley, 1989). 
"Another 20 million jobs, or so, will be created in the next 
decade, but the service industry will swallow nearly all of them, said 
William B. Johnson, a vice president of the Hudson Institute and 
director of a study on the issue entitled, 'Workforce 2000.' The nation 
is facing a monumenta 1 mismatch between jobs and the ab il i ty of 
Americans to do them" (Bernstein, 1988, p. 104). 
Bernstein (1988) claimed that three forces were combining to 
produce the leap in the skills that the economy required. First, 
technology upgraded the work required in most jobs. Second, job 
formation was fast; mainly, in high skill occupations with most in the 
service sector. Finally, the way work was being organized required a 
complete new set of skills. As companies shifted to work teams and 
participative management schemes, employees needed to sharpen their 
abilities to communicate. 
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Zemke (1989) wrote that technology was a major force that was 
driving change and that will contribute to the need for increased 
literacy levels since the latest production technologies were too 
sophisticated for many of the people entering today's workforce. 
Technology would force business to retrain 75% of their current 
workforce by the year 2000 (Dentzler, 1989). In addition, 90% of all 
jobs would be candidates for augmentation, replacement, or displacement 
by expert systems or other forms of artificial intelligence between 2000 
and 2005 (Ehrlich & Garland, 1988). 
Cooperman {1988) wrote that the United States economic model was 
clearly the most desirable, as evidenced by its application in the 
Pacific rim and in the emerging economies of the Eastern bloc. The 
emerging economies were working on three variables to implement the 
above model: the first was to improve literacy, the second was a 
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commitment to technological leadership, and last, to reinforce the work 
ethic. 
Bennett {1990) claimed that some productivity experts felt that if 
business was working on improving labor productivity, they were wasting 
time. Very few companies had more than 10% labor costs, and cash flow 
was more important than earnings per share. Yet, employee involvement 
was a way of not only improving attitude but also of making an 
improvement in costs, an incremental journey in becoming more 
competitive. 
Management Restructure 
Labich {1990) wrote that after a decade of mergers and buyouts, of 
downsizing and upheaval, he believed that corporate America was 
suffering an executive brain drain. The radical restructuring of the 
1980's had given today's managers a jaundiced view of the corporation 
for which they work. The implied contract between employee and employer 
had been altered and there was a low level of trust at some companies. 
United States corporations may be at a disadvantage battling Asian or 
European competitors that still enjoy fiercely loyal work forces. 
Pascarella and Peters {1984) found that managers liked to think of 
themselves as agents of change--as people who manage change. But they 
claimed that managers had fooled themselves by thinking their systems 
and controls had brought positive change. Leaders empowered people, 
giving them the resources and environment in which they could find the 
route to change. 
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Hillkirk (1990) wrote that Deming believed that the United States 
economy was rapidly deteriorating and that only United States managers 
had the power to do anything about it. The solution was to change 
society. "Teach kids cooperation, not competition. Eliminate grades in 
school and merit pay at work. Give workers the power to do their jobs 
correctly, and systems and tools that let them enjoy their work" 
(Hillkirk, 1990, p. 4B). 
Middle managers had been caught in massive workplace changes which 
had been the result of global competition, advancing technologies, and 
new managerial philosophies. Traditional roles as protector of 
management perogatives had given way to a new function "as the liaison 
between management and labor" (U.S. Government, 1990, p. 31). 
Scores of large organizations had sharply cut staffs over the last 
few years, but few had realized the expected cost savings. Cutting 
staffs to cut costs was putting the cart before the horse. Drucker 
(1991) stated that the only way to reduce costs was to restructure the 
work which would result in the reduction of people required to do the 
job. 
Zemke (1990) stated that the bodycount was mounting. DOWNSIZING: 
RESHAPING THE CORPORATION FOR THE FUTURE, estimated the toll at 1.5 
million managers and climbing. Amands Bennett, a staff reporter for the 
Wall Street Journal, doubled that figure to three million. Managers 
made up 10% of the United States labor force in 1980, while they 
accounted for only 4.4% of the jobs in Japan, 3% in Germany, and 2.4% in 
Sweden. Every gain in blue collar and factory productivity registered 
over the last 10 years had been offset by decreases in white-collar 
efficiency. 
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Drucker (1988a) believed that the typical large business, 20 years 
hence, would have fewer than half the levels of management of its 
counterparts today and no more than a third of its managers. 
Unions 
"The role of unions is also declining. The shifts within American 
industry from traditional manufacturing to high technology have 
preempted unionization. Union membership continues to decline: from 
27.3% of the labor force in 1970 to 18.6% in 1985, with a projected 15% 
expected in 1995" (Cooperman, 1988, p. 21). 
The government had taken over the role of the unions by dealing 
with pensions, insurance, worker's compensation and senority protection. 
"Unions are an expensive insurance that people no longer need" 
(Robertson, 1987, p. 1). 
According to Cohen (1990b), competition had revolutionized 
relations between management and labor who had found that both must 
become partners to survive. Though there had been a growing alliance, 
conflict remained. He stated that cooperation was really co-opting. 
For partnerships to make their businesses more competitive, both 
sides--management and unions--must adapt. Managers must relinquish some 
authority and give workers more responsibility, while unions must become 
more flexible to increase competitiveness. 
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Productivity 
The productivity of America's non-farm workers fell 0.8 percent in 
1990, the worst decline since 1982, and the first back-to-back reversal, 
coupled with the 1989 drop of 0.7 percent, in a decade (Associated Press 
[AP], 1991). 
Increasing productivity, or getting more worker output per hour on 
the job, was considered vital to increasing the nation's standard of 
living without inflation. According to the AP (1991), the United States 
continued to lose its competitive edge in international markets which 
threatens a long-term reduction in living standards "unless one of two 
things happen--either the quality of our labor force is improved through 
education, or we sharply improve savings and investment in new plants 
and equipment" (AP, 1991, p. 13). 
Toffler (1990) believed that all of the old economic theories, 
models, and measurement methods, designed for the smokestack era, were 
becoming increasingly obsolete, including management's notions of 
efficiency and productivity. The mass production of millions of 
identical products was viewed as "modern times" but today, 
computer-driven technologies make it possible to turn out small runs of 
increasingly customized goods and services aimed at niche markets. 
In the 1920's, one out of every three Americans in the labor force 
was a blue-collar worker in manufacturing. In the 1950's the figure was 
one in four. The figure was one in six in the 1980's and dropping, and 
even with this, manufacturing remained steady at 23% to 24% of Gross 
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National Product (GNP) over the last 30 years, and had grown in absolute 
terms (Drucker, 1988b). 
Future Organizational Trends 
In summary, Allen (1990) forecasted that the organization of the 
future would be flexible and strong and that it would be in a constant 
state of change. Wasteful, inefficient, and rigid organizations would 
cease to exist, and more productive and innovative organizations would 
take their place. Future trends in work may include: organizational 
power pushed to lower levels, decentralized organizational structure and 
decision making, increased emphasis on service industries, line 
supervisors who take more responsibility as a teacher and resource for 
their employees, increased power to consumers and constituents, 
autonomous work teams and entrepreneurial groups, more fluid 
organizational structures, informal approaches to work, a wider degree 
of diversity among employees, recognition of individual need for 
self-fulfillment and growth, and greater rewards for innovation and 
creativity within the organization--in otherwords, a participative 
approach to operating the business. 
Japan Incorporated 
No discussion of economic well being, productivity, or work groups 
could be complete without a brief look at the economic marvel known as 
Japan Incorporated. 
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Japan's accomplishments and processes were important because they 
were our main competition and were the ones that inaugurated the use of 
work groups into the manufacturing process. We, in the United States, 
needed to understand their system because we were trying to emulate 
their success. 
National Focus 
Japan had demonstrated clearly the positive effects of creating a 
national focus on serious issues. Studies had looked at our toughest 
competitor; Japan: 
* Had the lowest crime rate in the world. 
* Had the lowest unemployment rate in the world. 
*Had the highest average life expectancy. 
*Had the best transportation and commuter systems. 
* led the world in patents. 
* Had the toughest pollution control standards. 
* Ranked first in scores on international achievement tests in 
science and math taken by school children. 
*Had the highest percentage of students completing high school. 
*Had the highest literacy rate (Grazier, 1989). 
11 What works for the Japanese is a system, an idea, a covenant, a 
culture of adversity. There is a covenant on the part of the average 
person to be a part, to accept authority; a covenant on the part of the 
person at the top of the matrix to be respectful of those below him. 
They had a capitalism different from one being utilized by the United 
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States, a state-guided, communal capitalism. The people at the top do 
not earn that much, and the people at the bottom do not earn too little" 
(Bodek, 1989, p. 9). To the Japanese there were a number of component 
parts that were important: 1.) Japan had the best blue-collar workers 
in the world, not just in attitude but in preparation, 2.) had a high 
number of practical engineers flooding the factory floor making tiny 
little improvements and designing for quality, 3.) had a close 
incestuous relationship between banks and companies, which allowed for a 
long term approach to business, and 4.) leadership of the high 
bureaucracy, MITI (Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry), guided Japan's limited resources into areas where the 
resources could do the most good (Bodek, 1989). 
Why Had Japan Kept Winning 
Forget Just In Time (JIT). The answer was bigger: it practiced a 
different brand of capitalism, dominated by industry alliances. Mention 
shareholder rights to a Japanese executive, and one heard about employee 
rights. In the United States, shareholders, managers, and employees 
aimed at one thing--money, money, money. KEIRETSU. In America, it 
would be called collusion. In Japan, it was called a business alliance 
(Rapoport, 1991). 
In an attempt to identify the key ingredients that made the 
Japanese such a powerful force in global business, it boiled down to the 
fact that the Japanese had higher expectations than most Americans and 
Europeans (Kearns, 1989). 
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KAIZEN strategy was the single most important concept in Japanese 
management--the key to Japanese competitive success. KAIZEN meant 
ongoing improvement involving everyone--top management, managers, and 
workers. The most important difference between management concepts was 
the Japanese, process-oriented way of thinking versus the West's, 
innovation-and-results oriented thinking (Imai, 1986). 
Imai (1986) continued by stating that the results-oriented criteria 
for evaluating people's performance was probably a legacy of the 
"mass-production society," and the process-oriented criteria was gaining 
momentum in the post industrial, high tech, high touch society. KAIZEN 
was a humanistic approach, because it expected all employees to 
participate and was based on the belief that all could contribute to 
improving the workplace where workers spend one-third of their lives. 
One of the distinctive features of Japanese work organizations was 
the cohesiveness of work groups and the strong social bonds that 
developed between superiors and subordinates. The survey underscored the 
pattern that Japanese reported two close friends at work while the 
Americans' averaged fewer than one (Peters, 1990). · 
Peters (1990) continued by pointing out that the average Japanese 
employee had thirty suggestions per year, while the average American 
employee had .14. The Japanese implemented 75% of the suggestions, the 
United States, a miniscule number. 
Lincoln (1989) reported that Japanese supervisors functioned as 
counselor and confidante to their work groups, building communication 
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and cohesion with a minimum of direct, authoritarian control, as opposed 
to the American worker who wanted an arms length approach. 
Lincoln (1989) found that organizations which, in Japanese fashion, 
coupled formal centralization with de facto participation had more 
committed and satisfied employees. 
"The way to make great leaps is to take many small steps, 
consistently, every day" (Rehfeld, 1990, p. 169). 
The Human Resources Approach 
American companies had now discovered what the Japanese learned 
long ago: people--not technology alone or marketing ploys--were the keys 
to success in global competition. American workers could be just as 
productive as Japanese workers. The keys to Japanese competitive 
superiority were their management and production systems, not some 
unique feature in Japan's group-oriented culture (Hoerr, 1989). 
"The emergence of training and management, rather than cultural 
uniqueness, as the true secret of competitiveness, and of automation as 
the new manufacturing organization, must be recognized as it has been by 
Japan" (Drucker, 1987, p. 925). 
According to Racicot (1990), Japan relied on discipline and 
responsibility to get ahead, the United States hid behind past 
accomplishments. 
A top Japanese politician, Yoshio Sakurauchi, was quoted as 
describing the American worker as "being lazy, that thirty percent of 
the workers could not read, and that American workers want to get high 
salaries without working" (Healey, 1992, p. 1}. In 1984, a Japanese 
professor proclaimed the following law, known as "The Law of 
Technological Civilization": 
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The forces changing the world today are basically 
technological, not military or political. Military rivalries are 
essentially obsolete. The tumultuous military confrontations 
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have no essential meaning as far 
as the logic of history is concerned. Military and political forces 
can be reduced fundamentally to economic forces, and economics are 
based on technology. The world moves in whatever direction is 
dictated by technology, and the power of technology to change the 
world will become increasingly strong in the future. The world's 
geopolitical axes will converge more and more at the location where 
the new technology reigns. That center of convergence is, of 
course, Japan. S. Umano, 1984 
The Workplace 
Sheridan (1990} believed that the key ingredients that were 
essential for a world class manufacturer were: total quality 
management, Just In Time, and a work team approach in which workers 
assumed responsibility for a particular operation and were given the 
training to handle the added responsibility. Becoming world class was 
continually and rapidly improving in the eyes of the customer. 
Manufacturers needed to speak in terms of becoming, rather than being 
there, because the world's standards of performance always increased. 
Thus, being "world class" could never be achieved. 
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In a growing number of companies, work teams were seen as an 
excellent means of fostering employee involvement. World Class 
Manufacturing lessons/action agendas included getting to know the 
customer, cutting WIP, reducing flow/manufacturing cycle times, cutting 
set-up and change over times, cutting flow distance and space, 
increasing make/deliver frequency, reducing the number of suppliers, 
cutting the number of part numbers, making it easier to manufacture 
without errors, arranging the workplace to eliminate search time, cross 
training, assuring that line people got first crack at problem solving 
before staff organizations, seeking to have plural, instead of singular 
workstations, and automate incrementally when process variability cannot 
otherwise be reduced (Schonberger, 1982). 
Executives need to re-think how corporations hired and managed the 
work force. The keys to success were training and motivating workers to 
fully exploit today's sophisticated machinery (Nasar, 1989}. 
Grooms (1990} believed that in order to achieve success, all 
employees needed to be treated as equal partners in the day-to-day 
activities of the company. This approach proved to be easier in a 
start-up operation because there were no existing cultural hang-ups to 
confront. 
Grooms (1990} pointed out that management needed to acknowledge 
that the future belonged to only those organizations that could 
coordinate the total efforts of all its employees to meet the goals of 
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the organization. According to Dr. Deming, management represented 88% 
of the problem and management's task should have been to create an 
environment that established an atmosphere of open communication, mutual 
respects trust, and empowerment. 
Improving one's business processes was the key to increased profits 
and market share according to Harrington (1988). The only way 
improvement gains could be effectively and permanently embedded in the 
fiber of the company was through changing the systems that controlled 
the company's operations. It was not employees or managers that caused 
the bulk of the errors, rather the operating systems that governed and 
controlled the company's performance (Harrington, 1990). 
To get economies of scale, companies had organized in vertical 
functioning groups. Most work activities flowed vertically not 
horizontally. The horizontal workflow and vertical organization 
resulted in many voids and overlaps, and encouraged sub-optimization, 
causing a negative impact on the efficiency and quality of the 
operation. Employees must work WITHIN the process, and management must 
work ON the process (Harrington, 1990). 
Characteristics of Participative Plants 
Lawler (1990) believed that characteristics of new participative 
plants were: 
SELECTION- the selection process in the new participative plants 
placed a great deal of emphasis on acquainting applicants with the 
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nature of the jobs and with the nature of the management style utilized, 
some utilized a selective process by the workers themselves. 
PLANT PHYSICAL LAYOUT- notible for the degree to which the 
workplace was egalitarian. 
JOB DESIGN- employees determined who and how the task was to be 
carried out. Employees set production targets, quality metrics, and 
controlled employee behavior. 
Although self-managed work teams had become more popular, most 
studies suggested that a relatively small percentage of the work force 
(less than 10%) operated with this structure. What had become extremely 
popular was the use of quality circles, or problem solving teams. Some 
studies suggested that more than half of all large corporations used 
them (Lawler, 1990). 
PAY SYSTEM- instead of using a job evaluation approach, new plants 
evaluated skills of individuals and paid according to the number and 
kind of skills one possessed. Studies showed that less than 20% of the 
work force had "skill-based pay" (Lawler, 1990). 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE- characterized by very flat structures and 
extremely wide spans of control. Most of the plants featured only two 
levels of management, though there may be three in larger ones. Many of 
the reductions had been carried out simply to cut costs (Lawler, 1990). 
TRAINING- the new participative plants heavily emphasized training, 
career planning, and personal growth. 
MANAGEMENT STYLE- pushed decision making responsibility down to the 
lowest possible level. 
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These new plants were generally acknowledged to be effective and 
were likely to continue to proliferate. Conversion of the old plants to 
the participative model was likely to grow simply because there were so 
many that needed improvement (Lawler, 1990). 
Unions 
Ephlin (1989) believed that the dawn of the flexible work force had 
divided organized labor down the middle. Many workers feared that cross 
training devalued their job skills making them more vulnerable to 
layoffs. Older workers, on the other hand, felt that the sharing of 
skills deprived them of their traditional right to an easier job as they 
approached retirement. Much of the opposition came from deep-rooted 
worker suspicion of management. 
"The union getting in bed with management? Why not? They own half 
the bed (Wilgus, 1990, p. 631)." The practical keys for creating a 
responsible employee atmosphere in a union, or a non-union environment, 
were work design, the reward or discipline system, utilization of 
employee ideas, and whether management acted as "cop or coach" (Wilgus, 
1990, p. 632). 
Much of the resistance to the employee involvement thrust among 
union leadership was rooted in the traditional labor-management 
relationship, based as it was on detailed contracts, the uniform 
administration of provisions, narrow job designs, and an emphasis on 
stability. The union power base was being challenged by the movement 
toward collaboration, flexibility, and change. Power, wherever it lies, 
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cannot, in the long run, be disassociated from responsibility {Thompson, 
1987). 
Huber (1986) believed that in order to be successful there needed 
to be a relationship based on trust, one where the leaders of both union 
and management start the process. 
The American Workforce 
Ira Magaziner, chairman of Commission on Skills of the American 
Workforce, worried that the United States was becoming distinctly less 
civilized. "He pointed out that some 2,000 years ago, Aristotle 
described the difference between a civilized culture and a barbaric one. 
In a civilization, Aristotle said, society advances because every 
generation of parents tries to do more for its children. Barbarians 
live only for the day and accumulate in order to consume, then 
accumulate again. Since this republic was founded, we have had ten 
generations that have left more to their children than they have 
inherited, our generation is in danger of doing the opposite. We are 
selling off our assets and leaving our children with a huge national and 
international debt" (Perry, 1990, p. 146). 
An anonymous copywriter came up with a slogan that fast became the 
phrase of the land: "People are our most important asset." Companies 
loved it. Soon, the line appeared in annual reports everywhere. The 
only problem was companies did not really value their employees very 
much. "One day, foreigners invaded the kingdom. These international 
companies were flexible, quick, and responsive to customers. Searching 
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for ways to compete with the invaders, a few American companies 
discovered that, given a little freedom and proper training, workers 
could do things that machines could not. People could grow, invent, and 
solve problems. Perhaps people truly were an enterprises most important 
asset" (Perry, 1991, p. 68). 
Remember the joke about cars that were built on Friday? The joke 
reinforced something consumers all felt: workers were responsible for 
poor product quality. In statistical analysis of quality problems, 
Deming found that the overwhelming majority of quality problems were 
caused by circumstances over which the worker had no control. In fact, 
worker caused quality problems amounted for less than 10% of the overall 
number. If the workers had not caused the problems, management must 
have. The experts adroitly shifted from worker bashing to management 
bashing. The American style of management was seemingly responsible for 
everything from quality problems to the common cold. Yet, the American 
managers were doing exactly what their Japanese counterparts were 
doing--managing according to a specific set of rules. The problems were 
rooted in the way American managers had chosen to run the business. Bad 
processes were the culprit, not bad people (Garwood, 1990). 
Garwood (1990) stated that the American management style was 
vitally concerned with worker efficiency and driving down labor costs. 
Time and motion studies were commissioned so that management would know, 
within a millionth of a second, how long a task took and could do a 
standard, versus actual cost comparison, for every operation. Of 
course, the shop supervisor had no time to supervise because all of 
their time was spent explaining variances. 
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When things went wrong in manufacturing, it was easy to blame the 
production workers. Traditionally, they had been considered the 
weakest, most vulnerable link in the chain of command. After all, as 
the theory goes, replacing a production worker was easier than replacing 
a manager or a machine (Fisher & Israeli, 1989). Companies still viewed 
the worker as a cost that should be minimized, not as a resource to be 
developed (Garwood, 1990). 
Nearly three-quarters of the engineers polled agreed with the 
statement that a poorly educated and trained work force hindered United 
States productivity. In concert with that opinion, 63% said that 
employees did not work as hard as they did in 1980. Eighty percent said 
the lack of a strong work ethic contributed to low productivity. In 
addition, large majorities stated that employees were not motivated at 
work, that they took less pride in their work, that they were less 
loyal, that they did not enjoy coming to work, that they were not 
enthusiastic about their jobs, and that they resisted change (Filipczak, 
Gerber, Gordon, & Thompson, 1990). 
Business people complained that many of today's young, entry level 
workers were not prepared for the workplace. Many such workers had high 
absentee rates, failed to perform high quality work, and lacked a 
cooperative work attitude. Three-fourths of the new work force entrants 
would be qualified for only 40% of the new jobs created between 1985 and 
2000 (Szabo, 1991). 
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Workforce Quality and Technology Adeptness 
American organizations had been short-changing their investment in 
human capital. After unsuccessfuly trying to solve productivity 
problems in the 80's by pouring billions into capital equipment, 
business leaders recognized that the only way to reverse this decline 
was to invest in people (Noack, 1991). Adam Smith wrote, over 200 years 
ago, in THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: "A man educated at the expense of much 
labor and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary 
dexterity and skill may be compared to one of those expensive machines" 
(Noack, 1991, p. 80). 
According to Noack's (1991) research, American corporations were 
spending $45 billion in formal training, and an estimated $200 billion 
on informal training, salaries, facilities, etc. This was almost equal 
to expenditures made on formal public education. 
To have world-class quality and costs, and the ability to 
assimilate new technology, the United States must have the world's best 
ability to develop human capabilities (Smith, 1987). 
Nationally, a University of Texas study revealed that 27 million 
adults in the United States were functionally illiterate. As companies 
moved in the direction of decentralizing management, with authority and 
responsibility moving down the organization, it became imperative to 
invest time and money to help employees expand their capabilities (May, 
1990). 
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Of all the paradigms discussed, the idea of "checking ones brain at 
the door when one picks up ones time card" was probably the most 
pervasive in American industry. For employee involvement to work, there 
had to be a baseline change in attitudes. A shift in the paradigm, "I 
think, you work," just would not work (Garwood, 1990). 
The urgency of retraining employees was hardly news. Every 
government commission, think tank, and business roundtable had grown 
hoarse with the same refrain: The days of plentiful labor were gone, 
and a shortage of adequately skilled manpower was here; "corporations 
can no longer afford to cast aside existing workers like spent machine 
parts but must retrofit them with the techniques and knowledge necessary 
to adapt to vast organizational, technological, and economic changes" 
(Houston, 1990, p. 35). 
Seventy five percent of the Human Resource executives surveyed 
stated that education had not kept up with the nation's technological 
growth. The United States was on a collision course with the reality 
that this nation was developing a second class work force. Money was 
being diverted to remedial education and to basic training from more 
productive uses, such as research and development (National Alliance of 
Business [NAB], 1990). 
The thinning of middle management to make companies more productive 
and competitive required profound changes in the way management looked 
at human resources. (Gaines, 1991). 
Although companies had embraced downsizing as a tool to lower costs 
as they struggled to remain competitive, their senior managers realized 
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that "they can only cut so much fat before hitting bone, muscle, nerves 
and vital organs. When the fat is gone, the remaining workforce will 
probably be of uneven quality" (Penzer, 1991, p. 97). The majority of 
employees to which management pays little attention, non-management, 
were the ones that represented the highest potential for the 
organization (Penzer, 1991). 
Penzer (1991) continued by stating that empowerment meant giving 
workers, at all levels, the knowledge, confidence and authority to use 
their judgement to make important decisions. The result could be a work 
force that was charged, dynamic, motivated and happy. 
"Right now, at most American companies, employees feel impotent. 
Bureaucracy is high, hierarchies are complex, workers are told what to 
do, and then hammered to improve" (Penzer, 1991, p. 98). The key to 
success was empowerment, and the key to empowerment was training 
(Penzer, 1991). 
Corporate Culture 
Corporate culture was a variable that needed to be evaluated 
because in order to implement change, the existing culture required 
modification, and took time (Dumaine, 1990a). 
"You've automated the factory, decimated the inventory, eliminated 
the unnecessary from the organization charts, and the company still 
isn't hitting on all cylinders--and you've got an awful feeling you know 
why. It's the culture" (Dumaine, 1990a, p. 127). 
Culture, as defined by a social scientist, consisted of the 
"man-made aspects of an environment" (Jennings, 1988, p. 3). For a 
company, that meant, among other things, an internal consistency that 
shaped behavior, values and patterns of how people thought, acted and 
spoke. More casually, culture was often defined as "the way we do 
things around here" (Jennings, 1988, p. 5). In otherwords, "culture" 
was what the company defined as "normal" (Jennings, 1988). 
"Culture is inertial; it resists change" (Fombrun, 1988, p. 81). 
It implied that anyone who wanted to alter a culture should first 
understand the ways in which that culture protected itself from change 
(Fombrun, 1988). 
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To a certain extent, corporate culture was similar to national 
culture. It, too, had its roots in history, legends, heroes, villains, 
achievements, disasters, recoveries and hardships. The most powerful 
manifestations of corporate culture revolved around the organization's 
heritage: legends about particularly colorful or powerful early 
managers or founders and their values and ideas including myths about 
ancient glories and legendary accomplishments (Manzini, 1986). 
Dumaine (1990a) stated that no culture change happened easily or 
quickly. Figure five-to-ten years for a significant improvement--but 
since the alternative may be extinction, it was worth a try. As always, 
actions spoke louder than words. Bosses transmitted values through 
rewards and punishments; ie., the compensation system revealed a great 
deal about what was actually rewarded and valued (Sirota, 1986). 
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Greiner (1967) stated that a few years ago the target of 
organization change was limited to a small work group or single 
department, especially at lower levels. The focus had now converged on 
the organization as a whole, reaching out to include many divisions and 
levels at once, and even the top managers themselves. 
The corporations that might succeed and flourish in the times ahead 
would be those that had mastered the art of change, those which created 
a climate that encouraged introduction of new procedures and 
possibilities. Those which encouraged anticipation of, and response to, 
external pressures and those that listened to new ideas from inside the 
organization (Kanter, 1984). 
Manzini (1986) believed that a corporation's culture could be a 
great asset, but could also be the greatest obstacle that may prevent 
management from looking at useful options. 
Kilmann (1985) stated that culture provided meaning, direction and 
mobilization, a social energy that moved the corporation into either 
productive action or destruction. A large culture gap in industry may 
have related to the productivity problem in the United States. 
The single most important determinant of corporate culture was the 
behavior of the CEO. "Shared vision" was the significant element in the 
system. Bennis (1986) defined leaders as people who did the right 
thing, and managers as people who did things right. Management dealt 
with efficiency and with making things run properly. Leadership, in 
contrast, was concerned with identity--why the organization was here; 
what our organization's business was; what our organization's 
destination, goals, mission and values were. 
In order to get others to change, managers must change first. 
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Management by influence, rather than management by authority, was the 
style for action. There must be a climate of equality, fear must be 
driven out, and management must learn to take orders from the situation, 
not from each other (Hannah, 1990). 
Dillingham (1991) believed that employees and companies must not 
fool themselves into treating change as a temporary state, as evidenced 
by a Coors Brewing Company survey taken in 1990. People wanted to be 
part of the solution. 
Types of Culture 
According to Deal and Kennedy {1982), there were four major types 
of cultures: 
THE TOUGH-GUY/MACHO CULTURE- regularly took high risks and received 
quick feedback, attracted individuals that want to be "stars." 
THE WORK HARD/PLAY HARD CULTURE- genera 11 y found in sa 1 es 
organizations where fast feed-back but low risk was the rule. 
THE BET-YOUR-COMPANY CULTURE- Invested millions in the future, and 
the heroes and survivors had the character and confidence to 
wait--progress was the most important product. 
THE PROCESS CULTURE- the low-risk/slow feedback process culture 
typically found in banks, government bureaucracies and utilities 
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striving for technical perfection, and the system's integrity was placed 
above all else (Deal & Kennedy, 1982). 
Culture and Change Efforts 
Successful change efforts focused on the work itself, not on 
abstractions like "participation" or "culture" (Beer, Eisenstat, & 
Spector, 1990). 
People were writing about a "covenant" and not a contract between 
the employee and the.company as a basis for superior management. The 
trend away from standardized mass production to specialized, high value 
added work, made command and control management less feasible. Coach 
and cajole leadership could not succeed unless employees' creativity was 
unleashed (Stewart, 1991). 
Analysis revealed four types of tactics utilized in trying to 
accomplish change. The study found a 100% success rate when key 
executives used an intervention tactic, but observed this tactic in less 
than 20% of the cases. Both the persuasion and participation tactics 
had 75% success rates; persuasion had the highest frequency of use, 42%, 
and participation the lowest, 17%. Both made high demands on resources. 
Implementation by edicts had a 43% success rate and a 23% frequency of 
use (Nutt, 1986). 
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Quality 
Industry had renewed its commitment to quality because quality was 
at the very crux of global competitiveness and the human side of quality 
was corporate America's greatest asset {Bemowski, 1990). 
"Employee dedication mirrors the extent to which an organization 
demonstrates its commitment to its people. When people know what is 
expected of them, understand that outstanding performance is rewarded, 
and believe that they can make a difference and will be listened to, 
they make a difference," stated Frederick Smith, CEO of Federal Express 
{Bemowski, 1990, p. 18). 
The quest for zero defects, as quality expert W. Edwards Deming 
advised in a recent paper delivered in Osaka, was not enough. That may 
be why six sigma was only the most prominent of five initiatives issued 
by Motorola to achieve an even more elusive goal at the company: total 
customer satisfaction. The other programs included participative 
management groups, profit improvements, product and manufacturing 
leadership, and cycle time development. Motorola's aim was to achieve 
plus or minus six sigma--equivalent to 3.4 defects per million parts. 
Put another way, the company wanted to be perfect in everything 
99.9999998% of the time {Gill, 1990). 
There were several steps a company could take to start on the road 
to quality. But only when top management insisted on quality, the 
company began the journey toward zero defects {Augenblick, 1990). 
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There were significant advantages to implementing total quality in 
a factory because people grasped the concept of quality easily. 
Furthermore, employees in a factory utilized measures, such as 
efficiency standards or production quotas, on a daily basis (Collitti, 
1986). 
Barriers to Quality 
Roger Milliken, chairman and CEO of Milliken & Co., said that 
businesses had learned that there were only three barriers to executing 
a successful quality improvement process. "The first is top management, 
the second is middle management, and the third is first-line management" 
(Bemowski, 1990, p. 18). 
According to Collitti (1986), the factory also had barriers to the 
total quality effort. For one thing, among the many people to be 
educated, some were illiterate and others had graduate degrees. Second, 
total quality was a difficult concept and it took time to understand. 
Third, total quality entailed a participative management style, and some 
people had trouble with that idea. Fourth, union management relations 
could have led to problems. Without good rapport, union officials may 
have viewed total quality as a threat to their existence. The keys to 
implementation were education and management commitment, in addition to 
complete participation. An individual who knew the machine best was the 
person who operated it, and that person needed to understand that it did 
not threaten his life or his job to participate in improving the 
operation. Finally, it was recognized that any change process takes 
time. Total quality should be looked at as a six-year process. 
The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award Criteria 
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In the Human Resource Utilization category, the award examined a 
company's efforts to develop and involve the entire work force in total 
quality. In addition, the award evaluated the effectiveness of the 
company's efforts to develop and realize the full potential of the work 
force, including management, and whether it maintained an environment 
conductive to full participation, quality leadership, and personal and 
organizational growth (United States Government, 1990). 
A total of 150 points out of the total of 1000 were assigned to the 
Human Resource section in the Baldrige scoring system (U.S. Government, 
1990). 
Employee Involvement Definition 
A working definition of employee involvement (EI) could be: a 
system of managing people, structures and systems that allow for a level 
of participation. Employee involvement was based upon the 
situation/task, the skills of the individuals involved, the willingness 
of the levels of management to allow participation, and the willingness 
of the people to participate in the process (Hannah, 1989). 
Banas (1983) stated that employee involvement should be defined as 
a process, not a program. A process that was defined as a series of 
activities or actions that led to a particular set of outcomes and had 
no time boundries. A program was a plan, or schedule, that had a 
beginning and an end. 
Participative management (PM) and employee involvement were two 
sides of the same coin. Employee involvement was concerned with 
participation as viewed from an employee perspective; Participative 
management from a management perspective (Banas, 1983). 
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Employee involvement had many meanings to many different groups of 
people. To the NON-SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEE, it meant anything from 
determining physical environment changes to being involved in and/or 
making decisions related to the job function. To the LOWER-LEVEL 
MANAGER, it meant an opportunity to delegate administrative tasks to 
technical people, or an opportunity for themselves to impact upon 
decision making. To the MIDDLE MANAGER, employee involvement meant a 
threat to their position, dependent on the amount of power and decision 
making currently in place, or it meant an opportunity to enhance their 
role and position in the organization. For UPPER LEVELS of management, 
it was seen as a method to stop the passing of "filtered data" along the 
hierarchical channels, to a complete restructuring of roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities for the purpose of more accurate 
efficient decisions and productivity, or perhaps, a scheme to get their 
decisions implemented through the teams (Hannah, 1989). 
Setting the Stage for Employee Involvement 
Barner and Fulbright (1991) believed that the success of employee 
involvement was in the ability to develop an organizational climate that 
supported its growth. Managers erroneously believed that employee 
involvement automatically occurred once employees and managers were 
trained and learned the benefits of employee involvement. In reality, 
many resisted because they did not understand their organization's 
employee involvement goals or their expected roles in the process. 
Managers resisted because they viewed employee involvement as a 
threat to their status and power. In addition, senior managers 
attempted to implement employee involvement because they wanted to get 
more out of their employees without truly developing partnerships or a 
team. Employee involvement would never be successful if viewed simply 
as an educational or communication program. Before beginning an 
employee involvement program, management needed to identify any 
roadblocks that prevented employees and supervisors from committing to 
full involvement (Barner & Fulbright, 1991). 
Employee Involvement-Overall Environment 
People were surrounded by news of the reordering of the world. 
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Walls, as well as patterns of behavior and political ideologies, were 
crumbling. The Eastern bloc countries were learning what the ancient 
Greeks knew thousands of years ago: decisions made by the many decision 
makers who were close to the action would always, over time, be better 
than those dictated from the top down, no matter how brilliant the ruler 
might have been (Grove, 1991). 
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People-the Key to Performance 
Verespej (1990a) believed that in the 90's people would be the key 
to the performance and competitiveness of American corporations. The 
most successful companies would be those that were most committed and 
creative in responding early to human resource issues. 
~ Grazier (1989) stated that employee involvement was no longer a 
••nice to do" concept. It was a philosophy of management that must be 
adopted because management must use all the resources available, 
especially the human mind, with its infinite capacity for creativity, 
imagination, and ingenuity, a resource of enormous proportion. 
Grazier (1989) continued by stating that Western philosophy said 
that work existed to provide goods and services, while Eastern 
philosophy said that work existed to enhance the human spirit. 
Verespej (1990a) claimed that people--both managers and 
workers--would have to grow without promotion, and companies would have 
to look at paying employees for competency and readiness, rather than 
their responsibilities. The realities of economic power shifted power 
from employers to employees. 
Empirical evidence suggested that employee involvement had 
significant benefits for an organization, including reductions in 
workers' resistance to change, more creative problem solving, increased 
organizational effectiveness, and--in some circumstances--increased 
productivity. Further, it was generally assumed that participation had 
significant benefits for the participators, such as increased job 
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satisfaction, higher motivation, and greater skills acquisition (Baloff 
& Doherty, 1990). 
It was expected that productivity in employee involvement plants 
would be 30 to 40% higher than in traditional plants (Garwood, 1990). 
Emplovee Involvement Studies 
Numerous studies in the 1960's and 70's found that a participative 
style lead to less turnover, lower absenteeism and higher levels of job 
satisfaction. Many who read these studies were ready to assume that 
higher job satisfaction led to greater productivity, increased 
profitability and better quality and service, though that might not 
really be the case (Dulworth, Landen, & Usilander, 1990). 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) surveyed 962 FORTUNE 1000 
companies in 1987. The result of the poll--which boasted a 52% response 
rate--showed that the vast majority of the surveyed firms had 
implemented some form of employee involvement over the last five years. 
According to the findings, the primary interest of these programs was to 
improve quality, productivity, employee morale, and motivation (Dulworth 
et a 1 . , 1990) . 
Changes were occurring in many plants, usually in non-union 
settings. But this philosophy did not work everywhere. It was 
pointless in factories with simple repetitive tasks (Cohen, 1990a), 
because there was no room for creativity or innovation in processes that 
were simple and engineered for "no-brain operations." 
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A study of 101 industrial companies found that the participatively 
managed among them outscored the others on 13 of 14 financial measures. 
The problem with participative management was that it worked. About 75% 
of all programs in the early 1980's failed--not because of the 
workers--but because of management. For as long as participative 
management had been around--there were experiments as far back as the 
1920's--middle managers and foremen had been reluctant to sign on. 
Managers who thought that their businesses were producing acceptable 
results were not interested in changing their ways. Fearing a loss of 
power, many middle managers torpedoed early participative management 
programs, for the experience had tended to confirm their opposition. 
The "if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it" notion may have held back U.S. 
management. The United States was great at maintenance management, and 
in making small improvements. Why not 40% improvement instead of 10%? 
Unions, people, and management were NOT ready for participative 
management (Saporito, 1986). 
In a survey of industrial companies with annual sales between $10 
and $200 million, more than two-thirds of the 250 respondents stated 
that lack of productivity in their companies was a problem; that is, 
their employees were the problem. In the study, 54% blamed people, 27% 
the process and technology, and 19% plants and equipment (Filipczak et 
a 1 . , 1990). 
Cutting costs rarely received much support from the work force 
itself; it meant, after all, laying off people. However, without active 
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work force participation, none of the measures needed for effective cost 
control were easy to implement (Drucker, 1991). 
Verespej (1988) believed that democracy and participative 
management were not the same thing. Democracy was a political 
philosophy that ascribed power to the people. Participative management 
was a practical approach to solving problems and achieving performance 
targets by utilizing people as resources. 
In spite of elaborate theories and complex formulas, Aubrey and 
Felkins (1988) stated that participation was a simple concept based on 
information sharing, collective decision making, and mutual trust; a 
concept utilized by an effective management team. 
What's Required for Success in American Corporations 
In the new era of stiff global competition, American corporations, 
according to Kizilos (1990), needed to respond much more quickly to 
market forces. At the same time, mergers and acquisitions and corporate 
restructuring and downsizing had made the concept of job security almost 
quaint. If workers felt empowered, the theory stated, they gained a 
better sense of control over their own lives and might be better able to 
cope. Empowered people did not view themselves as the victims of 
circumstance, but as shapers of their own destinies. 
Yet, as Kizilos pointed out, some experts cautioned that 
empowerment was unlikely to prove a panacea for all of corporate 
America's ills because many corporations did not know what this concept, 
empowerment, was all about; they were seeking quick fixes to major 
corporate culture problems. 
Participative management asked people for help, but empowerment 
was asking them to help themselves. 
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Kizilos (1990) believed that when an organization paid lip service 
to the ideas of empowerment, but failed to nurture an environment that 
supported empowerment, employees could become cynical and withdraw 
further than ever from aligning with company goals. 
Another theory, according to Brown (1989), stated that the key to 
effectively managing in the 1990's would be the knowing of how to 
install psychological ownership. Psychological ownership meant that 
everyone in a business felt a sense of responsibility for what was being 
done, and employees held themselves duly accountable for delivering 
whatever an organization pledged. Psychological ownership meant people 
working uas if they owned the place" (Brown, 1989, p. 47). 
Whether one was talking about a successful person or a successful 
company, there was an inescapable paradox that unothing fails like 
successu (Brown, 1991). 
Honeywell discovered that the people who made good multifunctional 
team members tended to be generalists, not specialists. Getting people 
to work in new ways required some training. In addition to training in 
empowerment and risk-taking, team members needed to develop 
problem-solving skills. Communication skills were also vital, 
especially when one was mixing together people from various disciplines 
who may not have worked together before and who began with a residue of 
suspicion from years of protecting turf, rather than working in synch 
(Gerber, 1989). 
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Cox (1991) stated that teams became teams by learning to be teams. 
Training in teamwork was required. Out of necessity, today's management 
style was one of quickened response. The need to belong was a powerful 
human force that found expression in teamwork. "Consensus-seeking was a 
time-wasting, leveling influence that impeded distinctive performance, 
yet the Japanese have performed in an outstanding manner utilizing this 
system. Collaboration without consensus was the soul of competitive 
advantage" (Cox, 1991, p. 22). 
Successful American Organizations 
It was no secret that many contemporary American organizations were 
in trouble. The problem, according to Bradford and Cohen (1984), was 
not so much obsolete factories, backward technologies, or lazy workers 
as it was outdated leadership practices. They believed middle and upper 
managers held the key to high performance in contemporary organizations, 
since they represented the greatest under-utilization of human 
resources. Bradford and Cohen wondered what characteristics a truly 
excellent unit needed. Their studies indicated that members shared a 
commitment to making the unit extraordinarily successful in 
accomplishing agreed on objectives. The focus was on quality, on 
genuinely collaborative team efforts, on confronting differences about 
work without petty infighting, and on continual attention to the 
development of members as integral to achieving the task. In this type 
of organization, information was freely transmitted among members, as 
well as between members and the boss. Finally, value was placed on 
diversity. Cohesion was produced by the commitment to a common goal 
toward which all worked (Bradford & Cohen, 1984). 
48 
The traditional emphasis on control and coordination had validity. 
The dilemma for the manager was not whether control needed to be 
exercised, but how to see that it was exercised without weakening the 
motivation of those with energy and enthusiasm (Bradford & Cohen, 1984). 
McKenna (1990) wrote that in order to effect improvement, leaders 
needed to encourage people "not to check their brains at the door," 
recognizing that past behavior was not the best predictor of future 
behavior, and that younger people seemed to accept employee involvement 
better than older people. Constant improvement was a value that could 
not be imposed upon people. The only way to get people to adopt 
constant improvement as a way of life in doing daily business was by 
empowering them (McKenna, 1990). 
People were empowered when they were totally willing and able, 
committed and competent. The idea of feeling as if one owned a process, 
a product, a service, a goal, whatever, was intrinsic to the concept of 
taking responsibility for it (Lee, 1991). 
One of the most baffling and hard to solve problems that business 
executives faced was employee resistance to change. A solution that had 
become increasingly popular for dealing with resistance to change was to 
get the people involved, to "participate" in making the change. 
Participation might never work as long as it was treated as a device to 
get other people to do what business leaders wanted them to do. Real 
participation was based on respect (Lawrence, 1990). 
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Hannah (1989) believed that it would be ideal if employee 
involvement systems could be introduced at the moment of an 
organization's birth. But that was not possible in the case of existing 
organizations which had already developed a set of operating norms, 
rituals, symbols, leadership behaviors, structures, and systems. 
Many managers had narrow mindedly sought a panacea for their 
troubles and mistakenly jumped on the bandwagons labeled "automation" or 
"technology." These managers had dumped thousands, sometimes millions, 
of dollars into "computer-integrated manufacturing" or robotics or 
strategic systems, only to find that in the end, people, not machines, 
made the difference. Technology did not make a business competitive. 
At best, it provided a short term edge, because the competition found 
ways of copying it. Companies achieved sustained leadership only from 
teamwork, excellent communication, common vision of goals, and a 
dedicated work force (Baudette, 1990). 
Types of Employee Involvement Groups 
Over the past decade, many forms of participation had emerged 
around the world. Monge and Miller had created a typology of the four 
major programs used to increase the amount of worker input into 
organizational matters (Goldhaver, 1990). 
Goldhaver (1990) began by citing the first as the European 
industrial democracy, which allowed workers to elect representatives who 
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participated on committees at various levels throughout the 
organization. This type of program was typically found in West Germany 
and socialist countries, such as Yugoslavia. 
The second type, frequently found in the United States, was the 
Scanlon System. This system involved the use of employee committees, or 
work groups, which included workers in everyday decisions regarding 
innovation within the work place (Goldhaver, 1990). 
The third type was the Chinese Down-the-Line program, which was 
initiated during the cultural revolution in China and was designated to 
decrease the role of the state in the industrial system and increase 
worker participation and organizational independence. This form of 
participation was different to most because the main emphasis was 
getting higher level employees involved in the work of their 
subordinates. Workers elected congresses, which represented all 
demographic types in the work force. These congresses dealt with a wide 
range of organizational issues, such as the election of managers, 
performance appraisals, and acceptance of managerial proposals 
(Goldhaver, 1990). 
The last form of participation, quality circles, was originally 
used in Japan and caught on strongly in the United States (Goldhaver, 
1990). The quality circle was a Japanese innovation, circa 1962, that 
formally mobilized small voluntary teams of workers in order to improve 
quality and productivity (Schonberger, 1982). 
In the early 1980's, quality circles (as they were called in the 
United States) sprouted in Western industry, especially in North 
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America. Quality circles were first introduced in America, in 1970, by 
Lockheed Aircraft, and were patterned after the Japanese groups that 
dealt with everyday processes. The concept had caught the fancy of the 
organizational behavior community in the business colleges along with 
their practitioner counterparts in training and development posts in 
industry. "Circles" seemed to fit with what had been advocated all 
along--worker participation and group dynamics (Schonberger, 1982). 
The Team Approach 
Implementation of the team approach resulted in power 
redistribution and decisions being made faster at lower levels. Turf 
issues had disappeared as a concept as teams began more and more to work 
toward a common purpose (Peterfreund & Peterfreund, 1990). 
Self managed teams dramatically boosted the productivity of their 
companies. Many companies were discovering what may have been the 
productivity breakthrough for the 1990's, because if one really believed 
in quality, then when one examined the facts, it was empowering people 
that led to improvement, and it was empowering people that led to 
employee involvement teams (Dumaine, 1990b). 
Dumaine (1990b) was not referring to the teamwork that was praised 
at Rotary Club luncheons, or the quality circles so popular in the 80's, 
where workers gathered once a week to save paper clips or "bitch" about 
the lighting. What made superteams so controversial was that they 
ultimately forced managers to do what they had only imagined in their 
worse nightmares: give up control--because if superteams worked 
correctly, they managed themselves. 
Dumaine (1990b) continued that superteams were not for everyone. 
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They only made sense if a job entailed a high level of dependency among 
three or more people. The more complex, the more suited it was for 
teams. 
It was easier to build superteams into a new office or factory than 
to convert an existing one, Dumaine (1990b) believed. When an operation 
was starting, a company could screen people carefuly for educational 
skills and the capacity to work as a team and could train them without 
worrying about old bad habits such as 11 it's not my job 11 • 
Dumaine (1990b) continued by stating that transforming an old plant 
could take several years, versus only a year to eighteen months for a 
new one. There were four team player styles that were critical to the 
success of any team: CONTRIBUTORS, that brought information; 
COLLABORATORS, who offered inspiration and a sense of purpose; 
COMMUNICATORS, who resolved conflict and built consensus; and 
CHALLENGERS, who questioned goals and methods (Parker, 1989). 
V/ Teams as Building Blocks 
Leavitt (1975) believed that small groups worked well for people 
because they satisfied important membership needs, and groups would 
provide support in times of stress and crisis. Groups were also a good 
problem finding tool and seemed to be useful in promoting innovation and 
creativity. In a wide variety of decision situations, groups made 
better decisions than individuals. 
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According to Leavitt (1975), groups were a great tool for 
implementation because groups gained the commitment from the members so 
that group decisions were more likely to be willingly carried out. 
Also, groups would control and discipline individual members in ways 
that were extremely difficult through more impersonal systems. 
As organizations grew larger, small groups were a useful mechanism 
for fending off many of the negative effects of large size. The 
difficult question was whether Americans were willing to work in such 
apparently counter-individualistic units (Leavitt, 1975). 
Steps in Launching Employee Teams 
The systems described as employee involvement were frequently 
referred to by other terms, such as, participative management, quality 
of work life, and employee participation (Dulworth et al., 1990). 
Companies reported that the major reason for implementing an 
employee involvement system was to improve productivity and quality. An 
overwhelming majority of companies--more than 80%--stated that their 
employee involvement systems had a positive impact on those performance 
indicators. About 20% of the companies that responded to the GAO survey 
stated that they did not have any type of employee involvement system, 
and the major reason cited was that their cultures were incongruent with 
participation and involvement principles. Interestingly, 67% also cited 
this as a major reason behind management skepticism of the impact of 
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employee involvement on improved organizational performance. The GAO 
survey suggested that beyond a faulty initial system design or lack of 
top management support, the inability to integrate employee systems with 
the organization's primary systems was the main reason for failure 
(Dulworth et al ., 1990). 
Dulworth et al. (1990) continued by stating that another reason for 
failure stemmed from the difficulty in trying to change an organization 
with an autocratic management style and culture and a hierarchical 
structure into one with a participative management style and flat 
structure. 
The first year was deemed crucial for any participative process. 
This was the time for testing, evaluating, and adjusting the program to 
meet the needs of a particular organization (Aubrey & Felkins, 1988). 
Steps in Starting an Employee Involvement System 
Eight steps in launching employee involvement systems should be: 
1.) Management/union involvement and support required. 
2.) Establishment of a steering committee. 
3.) Diagnosis of the organization. 
4.) Selection of the pilot area. 
5.) Preparation of the organization. 
6.) Establishment of a local pilot project. 
7.) Evaluating and fine tuning initial endeavor. 
8.) Generalization and extension. 
When creating conditions for large system changes, three factors 
had proven to be critical: building ownership among line managers, 
. assuring that adequate resourc::es were avai}able for the change effort, 
and the dissemination ()f learning (Walsh, 1984). 
Stokes (1990) stated t~at for a group to .become a team, two 
::. . . .. . -. 
dynamics must be present--team members must understand, accept, and be 
committed to a common mission, and teain members must understand that 
. . ·. . 
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they need each 6t~er to accomplish that mission and behave accordingly. 
Employee Involvement's Role in Enhancing Productivity 
.· · .. 
Perkins (1990) stated that a company's human resources were a 
competitive weapon. There was an awareness that well trained, highly 
motivated employees really could make a difference in terms of improved 
productivity, and improved. quality. 
Experts believed that the single most significant determinant in 
maintaining a country's standard ofliving was productivity growth. 
Since the growth of productivity in Ame'rica was 1 ast ·among the 
industrialized nations of the world; the experts again stated that the 
standard of living in the United States was declining and would continue 
declining as long as this p~o6le~ persisted (Grazier~ 1989). 
Grazier {1989) continued by stating that to survive and maintain 
our way of 1 ife, the. American workforce rou.st change the way it worked. 
Workers, including management, needed to renew the sense of purpose, and . 
needed to instill in all a sense of urgency about productivity. People 
needed to place responsibility for the success of organizations on.ALL 
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employees, not just a handful of managers. It should be recognized and 
understood that if ALL employees were responsible, then ALL employees 
should be more involved in the organization. 
Imai (1986) believed that in order to improve productivity, the 
first step was to ensure the cooperation and commitment of the workers. 
It was important to obtain labor's explicit understanding of and 
commitment to, the idea that productivity improvement was mutually 
beneficial. 
Adam Smith concluded 200 years ago that high productivity labor 
required a century or more of indoctrination and perfection of skills. 
And what was called "management"--the capacity to integrate working 
individuals into a social organization and to plan, finance, and 
market--Adam Smith thought took even longer to develop. Until quite 
recently, all historical experience supported Smith's conclusions. Now, 
however, low wages and high productivity were not seen as a unique 
product/element (Drucker, 1987). 
Learning from Our Competitors 
In the 1990's, the country that taught the world how to manage 
needed to take some lessons from others. Success depended on how the 
work was organized, how inventories were monitored, and dozens of other 
managerial decisions. Managers had to redesign the workplace and 
eliminate layers of bureaucracy to permit workers to adapt to new 
technologies more readily. As the American work force manipulated 
information and knowledge more than actual products, traditional command 
and control methods of "supporting the troops" were rendered obsolete 
(Mandel & Pennar, 1989). 
Most employees did not believe their work was being properly 
rewarded and believed that their companies were not doing enough to 
attract high quality performers, not doing enough to train them, nor 
manage them effectively (Gelfong & Grey, 1990). 
57 
An unwritten contract allowed companies to secure worker loyalty 
and performance in exchange for the promise of continued employment and 
a fair day's pay. Dynamic forces in the business environment had 
fundamentally reshaped the traditional contract, forces such as 
competition, technology, decentralized organizations, and deregulation 
(Gelfong & Grey, 1990). 
Practices at successful companies had revealed distinct 
relationships between human resources practices and improved 
performance. Successful companies placed greater emphasis on pay for 
performance, training, and career development. European companies 
motivated more by involvement and identification; North Americans more 
by pressure and extrinsic rewards. If organizations were to respond 
successfuly to the needs of their employees, they needed to ensure that 
their corporate beliefs and value systems were aligned with the 
predominant values of their work force (Gelfong & Grey, 1990). 
Pay As a Motivator-A Myth Destroyed 
When pay was mentioned in connection with studies, it was usually 
pointed out that studies showed the relative unimportance of pay in 
58 
comparison to such things as interpersonal rewards and group norms. 
This conclusion was wrong, and it was unfortunate that it was widely 
accepted. When employees did not trust management, instead of believing 
that good performance would lead to higher pay, they believed that it 
would lead to higher standards (Lawler, 1975). 
Employees developed norms against high production, punished good 
performers, and provided management with false data about performance in 
order to protect themselves from having to work harder in order to make 
the same money (Lawler, 1975). 
Items to Consider for Improved Performance 
Franco (1991) stated that most companies were starting to believe 
that competitive success hinged on the abilities of their people, pure 
and simple. 
Blanchard (1991) taught that the important points necessary to 
improve employee and organizational performance were captured with the 
acronym PRICE: pinpoint, record, involve, coach and evaluate. 
Hellervik (1991) stated that the quality of executive leadership 
was a crucial factor in improving performance. The skills that led 
middle management to be successful could become an obstacle to executive 
effectiveness. 
People were motivated by physical, social, and emotional needs, not 
monetary ones as believed by many authoritarian managers (McGrath, 
1985), a view disputed by Lawler (1975). 
59 
One kept hearing that the work ethic in America was dead. In a 
national poll conducted by PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Daniel Yankelovich found 
that the work ethic was alive, but that people were increasingly 
dissatisfied with the way their work was being organized and managed. 
The respondents felt that they were laboring for someone else's benefit, 
more than for their own, so they were not working any harder than 
necessary to keep their jobs (Davies, 1988). 
Summary 
The first two decades after World War II were eras of strong growth 
for United States productivity. The next two decades were eras of 
strong growth for analysis of American productivity. The productivity 
growth had dropped to about one percent a year, and observers started 
looking for solutions to the productivity problem. A major cause of the 
productivity slowdown, according to a 1979 FORTUNE article, was that 
business investment grew a feeble 1.4% annually from 1973 to 1978, 
compared with 3.9% from 1947 to 1973. Conservatives pointed to 
excessive regulation, environmental laws, and affirmative action as the 
causes for the poor productivity performance. Liberals blamed high 
military spending. Almost everyone could join ranks against too many 
lawyers (Schlefer, 1989). 
The MIT Commission concluded that the American productive system 
was not being eroded but had, itself, become obsolete. Mass production, 
once a powerful engine of growth, now perversely impaired American 
industry. In a competitive world where customers demanded high quality 
specialized products, American firms needed to regain traditions of 
custom tailoring (Schlefer, 1989). 
Appendix A has a more detailed evaluation and history of the 
manufacturing system in the United States and its effect on employee 
productivity and motivation. 
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"We focus on capital investment as a way to reduce labor ignoring 
the huge benefits to be gained from improved quality, reduced 
inventories, and faster introduction of new products. All the fuss is 
because rising productivity is the lever of economic development and 
growth. It provides what economists call 'costless' growth. When labor 
and capital, the two key factors of production, are most productive, the 
economy is performing at its optimum" (Pennar, 1988, p. 100). 
Hout and Stalg (1990) believed that forming teams might not produce 
time compression in companies. They continued by stating that 
implementing teams without changing the embedded work routines and 
management practices would not compress time. Leading companies' time 
management represented the most powerful new source of competitive 
advantage. 
The problem of declining productivity and work performance started 
slowly several years ago and had not vanished. If anything, it had 
worsened to the point that it was causing ever-increasing concern to 
companies, the government, and to most responsible Americans. During 
the past decade, wages had increased at an annual rate of 8.2%, while 
productivity growth had been limited to only 1.3%. BUSINESS WEEK 
estimated that the loss of competitiveness by American industry in 
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recent years equals $125 billion in lost production and some two million 
lost jobs (Stanton, 1983). 
Employee Involvement Results 
Verespej (1990a) reported that a survey of nearly 500 major 
businesses, by the American Productivity & Quality Center, found that 
more than 80% of them had some type of employee involvement program, but 
only 25% had significantly changed the way most of their employees are 
managed. 
Sheridan stated "productivity-improvement/cost reduction efforts 
utilize the sensible use of advanced technologies--such as computer 
integrated manufacturing (CIM), simultaneous engineering to shorten the 
design to manufacturing cycle, flexible equipment and people, solid on 
time delivery performance, extensive employee training, and partnership 
ties with suppliers and customers alike. But the most important element 
was good people management--the ability to build trust and unleash the 
full potential of a well trained, dedicated work force" (Sheridan, 1990, 
p. 27). 
Appendix B contains documented examples of results experienced by 
eight major corporations, and others, that have implemented employee 
involvement and participative management practices. 
After evaluating the results that have been published and portrayed 
in Appendix 8, one must agree that the results are spectacular. One has 
to wonder why all enterprises have not implemented this new 
management/employee approach. Perhaps, as postulated in the null 
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hypothesis, there were other factors that were driving these results and 
perhaps, leadership and good management practices are just as successful 
as the highly touted employee involvement approach. 
Problems Associated With the Employee Involvement Approach 
Problems as Viewed by the Individual 
The potential problems of using employee involvement had received 
much less attention in the literature than had the benefits, according 
to Baloff and Doherty (1990). When these problems were discussed, they 
were always viewed from the perspective of the organization. Very 
little had been written about the personal problems of the participants. 
Negative consequences could be experienced, especially during the 
initial start-up period. First, participants may be subjected to peer 
group pressure against what was seen as collaboration with management. 
Second, the participators' managers may attempt to coerce the 
participators during participation, or retaliate if the managers were 
displeased with the outcome. Third, participators had difficulty 
adjusting at the end of a participatory experience when they were thrust 
back into narrow, rigidly traditional tasks. Accumulation of these 
types of problems could undermine an entire program (Baloff & Doherty, 
1990). 
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Lack of Implementation in Japanese Owned Plants 
In spite of all the Western enthusiasm for quality circles (and 
their wide use in Japan), Japanese subsidiary plants in the West, 
generally, had not implemented them. Juran stated that quality circles, 
which he favored for their human relations benefits, could deal with the 
numerous small problems, but the major quality matters were related to 
vendor relations, management policies, process designs, and other areas 
outside the workers' sphere of influence (Schonberger, 1982). 
Junji Noguchi, general manager of the Union of Japanese Scientists 
and Engineers, stated that "workers and foremen could solve only 15% of 
all quality control problems. The rest must be handled by management or 
the engineering staff" (Schonberger, 1982, p. 164). 
Productivity Study 
Harrison (1991) claimed that no single idea about reorganizing the 
workplace spread so rapidly during the past decade as that of employee 
involvement. By 1987, half of all metal-working establishments in the 
United States had instituted labor-management problem solving 
committees. Workers had embraced these innovative activities for a 
number of reasons, ranging from relief of boredom to the hope of gaining 
new respect from supervisors. But managers flocked to employee 
involvement for its promise of greater productivity--and by that 
standard, employee involvement had not delivered. 
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Harrison studied more than 1,000 plants belonging to companies of 
varying size, some with and some without the joint committees. The 
companies encompassed 21 industries in the United States metal-working 
sector. The study found that employee involvement not only failed to 
help efficiency but, actually appeared to hurt it. Among smaller 
companies (those with single plants), the ones that had created employee 
participation committees were a quarter less efficient than those that 
had not taken the trouble. Among the larger companies, plants that had 
the committees were 46% less efficient (Harrison, 1991). 
Harrison (1991), in his study, asked why employee involvement was 
not delivering the results. One possibility was that plants were 
already in trouble and adopted employee involvement for that reason. 
But, fully 70 percent of the corporate branch plants already had 
employee involvement. It was possible that workers still did not trust 
management initiated programs, and were not yet willing to share the 
knowledge on which workers believed their job security depended. 
Employee Involvement and American Industry 
Peters (1987} stated that the average American worker was over 
supervised.· The average span of control in the United States was one 
supervisor to every ten non-supervisors. In Japan, the average span of 
control in an auto plant was one to 150. The winning organizations 
should add value with people involvement, the losing organizations 
continue to replace people with machines. 
The skills that were required for the would be participative 
manager--communicating, motivating, and championing ideas--"are sandy 
intrusions in the gearbox of many traditional executives." The "if it 
ain't broke don't fix it" notion might be holding back American 
management (Harrison, 1991, p. 74). 
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Day (1990) believed that participative management was about to face 
its stiffest test since the concept became fashionable in the early 
1980s: overcoming a stagnant economy. One could speculate whether 
participative management would have gained strength, legitimacy, and the 
momentum it now enjoys without the benefit of a strong, resilient 
economy. Numerous participative management triumphs had been solid. In 
fact, they had unwittingly created an unrealistic expectation: that 
worker-manager collaboration would magically solve every dilemma 
imaginable. 
Day (1990) continued by stating that participative management was a 
fragile concept. Nothing irritated or frustrated supervisors more than 
employees who ignored their authority and appealed directly to employee 
involvement forums to resolve routine problems. It should be recognized 
that not every idea submitted under the collaboration banner had merit. 
Some Perceptions of Employee Involvement 
Motivationalists had stressed that most people had a strong need to 
plan, organize, and control their work, and needed to have more of a 
participative input into matters that affected them on their jobs. 
However, not everyone had the ability, intelligence, or experience-- or 
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for that matter, the desire--to engage in such functions. To 
categorically expect all employees to engage in participative management 
was completely unrealistic and may even have invited chaos into the work 
place (Stanton, 1983). 
Attitudes had continued to change regarding work, and many people 
simply did not want to work hard any longer. The relative affluence 
that our country had enjoyed for many years gave rise to a preoccupation 
with the self, a dramatic rise in self indulgence, and an increased 
emphasis on instant gratification, and the pursuit of pleasure seeking 
activities--accompanied by a decline in commitment to work. Described 
another way, society "owed" people certain privileges--a good 
comfortable job and high income--the "psychology of entitlement.•• In 
short, many people had become fat, lazy, and complacent (Stanton, 1983, 
p. 212). 
Two Examples of Employee Involvement's Failure 
An example of problems experienced with work groups and employee 
involvement was best illustrated with an example from an Eastern bloc 
country: 
The workers of Yugoslavia took charge ages ago and had been in 
charge so long that some are tired of working for themselves. A 
movement had actually begun to hand power back to managers (Newman, 
1987). 
"The factories belong to the workers," Tito exulted when the idea 
was brought to him in 1949. The Yugoslavs call this "our socialistic 
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system of self-management." This self management was a source of 
national pride. Workers controlled everything, everything except the 
army. "And what do workers do when they run the show? If the pride of 
the Yugoslavs provide any pointers, the one thing they didn't do was 
invest their profits. They did award themselves fat raises. Then they 
borrowed. And when debt ruined the economy, inflation topped 85% and 
their buying power collapsed--they struck" (Newman, 1987, p. 45). 
The workers and bureaucrats blamed the party, the party and the 
workers blamed the bureaucrats, and, naturally, the bureaucrats and the 
party blamed the workers. Apart from raising pay, hiring was the 
executive act workers relished most. (They rarely fired anyone.) The 
workers decided that self management had to be stopped because the 
workers could not implement the decisions that had to be made in order 
to have a viable enterprise (Newman, 1987). 
Another example of problems associated with employee involvement 
was the data from the Wiring Room study which uncovered the fact that 
high performers were being held back by the other members of the group 
who feared that all members of the group would be expected to produce at 
the high performers rates. While this did not constitute negative 
evidence for Theory Y, it appeared that it did constitute negative 
evidence for employee involvement because in all the situations 
described in this study, employee involvement methods might not work at 
all. This was the only example of an outright conflicting 
interpretation of the meaning of the Hawthorne Studies (Lorsch, 1975). 
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Summary 
All too often, corporate leaders had read the success stories and 
ordained that their companies adopt work teams--NOW. So, perhaps, the 
first lesson needed to be that companies not plunge headfirst into this 
approach (Verespej, 1990b). 
Just as American firms were trying to implement Japanese management 
systems, Honda was centralizing. Nobuhiko Kawamoto, the president of 
Honda Motor Company since last June, was shaking up Honda's quirky 
corporate culture. Honda had gotten conservative and sluggish, he 
believed, it had simply grown too big for democracy. The Japanese 
company was charting a new course that emphasizes more individual 
responsibility for decisions. Honda was trying to become a flexible, 
responsive big company, instead of a flexible little company. Honda's 
top three executives stated that they would not completely abandon the 
"Republican" system but believed that it had been carried too far--too 
many things were done in groups--Honda's management had lost a sense of 
responsibility; the feeling that every individual had his own specific 
duties. Now, senior executives would get direct line responibilities 
and be held accountable (Chandler & Ingrassia, 1991). 
The virtues of employee involvement, defined broadly as a manager 
sharing decision making with subordinates, had been promoted 
enthusiastically in recent years. However, among senior executives, if 
one pays more attention to their actions than their speeches, the 
national love affair with employee involvement was less passionate. It 
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might be hard to find many executives who spoke out against it, but the 
realities of politics and power enabled few to practice it consistently. 
In theory, ''Employee involvement had three basic virtues: 
1.) The premise that several heads were better than one, 2.) the 
premise that a consensus decision was likely to be carried out more 
enthusiastically, and 3.) the premise that participation in decision 
making was effective on the job training that helped develop 
subordinates" (Herman, 1989, p. 54). 
Herman (1989) continued by stating that managers contemplating the 
notion of adopting a more participative style should consider the 
following: 
1.) Not introduce employee involvement when radical changes were 
needed quickly, 2.) seldom economical to try and build a participative 
team out of people who interacted only occasionally, 3.) participation 
was only conversation unless it produced action, 4.) effective employee 
participation did not always require final decision making, and 5.) not 
ask for participation in making a decision if the decision had already 
been made, 6.) ask, instead, how to make it work (Herman, 1989, p. 55). 
"Managers complained that groups were slow, and that they diffused 
responsibility, vitiated the power of the hierarchy because they were 
too democratic and created small, in-group empires which were very hard 
for others to penetrate" (Leavitt, 1975, p. 69). 
As it had been practiced, "participation" had not thrown off its 
heroic orientation. Second, much participation had focused on the least 
important issues, instead of letting the group become involved with the 
major issues that are troubling organizations. Finally, managers were 
inclined to use participation as a way of gaining acceptance for their 
own ideas and solutions, rather than utilizing the talents of the 
subordinates (Bradford & Cohen, 1984). 
Management Problems Associated With Employee Involvement 
Current Managerial Practices 
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Botkin, Dimancescu, and Stata (1984) asked whether corporate 
managers had not understood the importance of motivating workers and 
assisting them. One answer could be found in the Business Schools, 
where an elitist attitude about managing was inculcated in students. 
High salaries, much responsibility, and little contact with workers were 
the symbols of the MBA success. Worse, the MBA expected them as 
conditions of work--and got them. Another answer came from the 
corporate culture itself. Rewards and status, which were symbols of 
achievement, induced managers to behave as "managers." Delegating and 
controlling were more valued than participating and sharing of 
responsibility. 
Marrow (1975) believed that the leaders of organizations recognized 
that the present work force was better educated, more affluent, and 
brought greater expectations for self management and self actualization 
to the job. However, they had effected only minor changes in their 
managerial practices. Most had continued the traditional procedures 
which reinforced decision making at the top and denied the employees' 
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potential for responsibility, creativity and productivity. This was 
still acceptable to many older employees who had become accustomed to 
thinking in terms of economic rewards. But the young people did not 
share these material values. Money was important but not at the expense 
of the lifestyle they wanted. 
Marrow (1975) continued by stating that employees were unwilling to 
subordinate their personal wants and desires to meet the needs of the 
organization. The employees were prepared to risk economic penalties 
for taking days off, shifting jobs or engaging in sabotage. 
Marrow (1975) claimed that industry was overmanaged and 
overcontrolled. Employees in the future were even less likely to accept 
rigid controls than they do now. Young employees no longer believed 
that hard work pays off. They had a different notion of success. These 
employees were not willing to make personal sacrifices for economic 
security if it did not bring self fulfillment as well. 
The New Wave of Management Thinking 
Toffler (1990) stated that regulations that were endorsed by the 
majority of the workforce had a chance of being implemented. But, to 
invite the workers into the rule making process was to share power with 
them, a shift not all managers found easy to accept. 
Grove (1991) believed that decisions arrived at by decision makers 
close to the action, not a central source, was the focus of a new wave 
in management thinking: employee empowerment. The idea sounded 
appealing, and it was easy to accept in theory. But despite all the 
talk, it was very hard to practice. Mainly, because it required that 
the boss wanted to LEARN. 
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According to O'Connor (1990), the biggest mistake management made 
when implementing the team player concept was that working toward a 
common goal, somehow, leveled out the difference between good and poor 
performance. Often, managers and supervisors made it very clear that 
they were only concerned with the end result, and since the end result 
was a "team" effort, good performance was less rewarded, and poor 
performance was often left entirely unnoticed. The team player concept 
received a second strike because employees did not believe in it, and 
did not trust what management told them. Strike three was that top 
management considered the team approach the panacea for what ailed 
organizations and did not remedy what was causing the deficiencies. 
Resistance to Employee Involvement Systems 
Cole and Tachiki (1984) pointed out that resistance to worker 
involvement was real. Resistance was a phenomenon that was credited 
with the failure of many efforts since the concept was introduced in 
1970. Within the organization there were three potential areas of 
resistance: the work force, management, and the union. Studies in 
recent years had shown that the most significant area of resistance was 
management. A 1982 study of 218 early adaptors of Quality Circles 
concluded that middle management resistance (79%) and lack of top 
management support (71%) were the top two factors hindering the spread 
of quality circles in their firms. 
Managers were the single biggest obstacle according to Lee {1990) 
because smoothly functioning work teams would gradually assume most of 
the supervisor's responsibilities. 
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Klein {1984) believed that in the work force, the resistance was 
caused by the credibility gap with management. Employees simply did not 
believe management was serious, because they had seen programs come and 
go. With union leadership, the resistance stemmed from its adversarial 
position with management. But, management resistance was more serious 
because management held the key to implementation and sustaining any 
change in the organization. They were the leaders, the models of how 
the organization should operate. 
Summary 
A natural step toward lessening management ranks was to create a 
more competent work force. Klein {1984) claimed that in a survey of 
first line supervisors conducted by the Harvard Business School, nearly 
three-fourths {72%) of the first-line managers surveyed viewed employee 
involvement as being good for the company, and more than half {60%) felt 
it was good for employees, but less than one-third {31%) viewed it as 
being beneficial for themselves. 
Call it employee involvement, or worker participation, or 
labor-management "jointness." Whatever the term, the concept had 
clearly troubled many Americans. Employee involvement gave managers a 
powerful tool to improve productivity and quality, but it could 
undermine their control. While many union officers still rallied 
against participation, more and more workers were willing to risk 
employee involvement in the hope of making their employers more 
competitive--and their jobs more secure {Hoerr, 1989). 
Failures of Employee Involvement Endeavors 
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Smither {1991) stated that the secret was this: teamwork was out, 
authoritarian leadership was in. To the chagrin of some managers, and 
to the relief of others, evidence was accumulating that many of those 
quality circles, "high performance teams", and autonomous work groups 
were not living up to expectations. Although researchers in academia 
had suspected this for at least ten years, only recently it had been 
depicted in the popular press. In its April 1, 1991 issue, BUSINESS 
WEEK published an item that stated that the productivity of the above 
mentioned groups were often unimpressive. Less than two weeks later, 
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL carried a story describing how Honda and other 
Japanese companies were moving away from teamwork and toward centralized 
management. 
Smither {1991) continued by citing that just as American firms were 
trying Japanese management styles, Honda was centralizing. Kawamoto, 
Honda CEO, found teamwork was no longer enough to boost market share. 
Honda had gotten conservative and sluggish because it had grown too big 
for democracy. The Japanese company was charting a new course that 
emphasized more individual responsibility for decisions. "We've done 
too many things in groups, we've lost a sense of responsibility" 
{Smither, 1991, p. 42). 
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Grazier (1989) cited a survey of employee involvement programs 
around the country that revealed that most efforts failed within a year 
of implementation. Many reasons were presented, but the leading cause 
of failure was insufficient management commitment and support. 
Authoritarian management had been characterized by a strict 
reliance on roles. Managers made decisions, subordinates carried them 
out. Authoritarian managers may rely on punishment to motivate, but 
they were just as likely to rely on rewards. The important thing to 
remember was that what defined authoritarianism was not punitiveness but 
where the decision making authority rested. Stripped of its ideology, 
authoritarian management was simply the practice of taking ultimate 
responsibility for both decisions and control of subordinate performance 
(Smither, 1991). 
Smither (1991) continued by stating that authoritarian management 
was not for everyone. It would not work if people felt strongly about 
having a say in decision making or if managers were more comfortable 
with employee participation in decision making. Some cases in which 
authoritarian management was most likely to work: 
1.) Where employees were poorly educated or uninterested in either 
responsibility or the organizational mission. 
2.) When productivity was more important than employee 
satisfaction. 
3.) When focus of performance was short-term rather than long-term. 
4.) When the manager was comfortable with a directive style. 
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5.) When the emotional ties were strong enough between leaders and 
followers so that workers would not resent strong direction. 
"Authoritarian" was not necessarily a synonym for oppressive or 
punitive management. There was no reason to believe that people who 
prefer to work in authoritarian environments were "psychological 
mutants" (Smither, 1991, p. 43). 
Smither {1991) believed that there were no causes to assume that 
teamwork or quality circles in themselves would result in higher 
productivity or greater job satisfaction. The crucial factor was the 
leader-follower bond. While it was true that some leaders could make 
teamwork succeed among their subordinates, it was equally true that some 
workers would rather rely on their leaders--not their co-workers--for 
guidance on the job (Smither, 1991). 
Miller (1991) stated that a fairly consistent finding in the study 
was that employee involvement systems had either no effect or a perverse 
effect on productivity. "Although employee involvement makes workers 
and managers 'feel good', it was largely irrelevant to productivity" 
(Miller, 1991, p. 24). 
Summary 
Nussbaum (1988) stated that the nation's ability to compete would 
be threatened by inadequate investment in our most important resource: 
people. The nation would be facing a monumental mismatch between jobs 
and the ability of Americans to do them in the year 2000 (Bernstein, 
1988). 
77 
Employee involvement proponents believed that employee involvement 
systems could bridge the gap and empirical evidence suggested that 
employee involvement had significant benefits for an organization, 
including reductions in workers' resistance to change, more creative 
problem solving, increased organizational effectiveness, and increased 
productivity. In addition, participation increased job satisfaction, 
resulted in higher motivation, and greater skills acquisition {Baloff & 
Doherty, 1990). 
Dulworth et al. {1990) believed that a participative style lead to 
less turnover, lower absenteeism and higher levels of job satisfaction. 
Employee involvement was a way of not only improving attitudes but also 
of making an improvement in costs {Bennett, 1990). 
A study of 101 companies found that the participatively managed 
outscored the others on thirteen of fourteen financial measures 
(Saporito, 1986), and it was expected that productivity in employee 
involvement plants would be thirty to forty percent higher than in 
traditional ones {Garwood, 1990). 
Companies reported that the major reason for implementing an 
employee involvement system was to improve productivity and quality. An 
overwhelming majority of companies, more than eighty percent, stated 
that their employee involvement systems had a positive impact on those 
performance indicators (Dulworth et al., 1990). 
Grazier {1989) stated that employee involvement was no longer a 
"nice to do" concept. It was a philosophy of management that must be 
adopted because management must use all of the resources available, 
especially the human mind, with its infinite capacity for creativity, 
imagination, ingenuity, and adaptability to change. 
In spite of elaborate theories and complex formulas, Aubrey and 
Felkins (1988) stated that participation was a simple concept based on 
information sharing, collective decision making, and mutual trust; a 
concept utilized by an effective management team. 
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The keys to implementation were education and management commitment 
(Collitti, 1986). Decisions made by the many decision makes who were 
close to the action would always be better than ·those dictated from the 
top down, no matter how brilliant the ruler might have been (Grove, 
1991). 
In spite of all the Western enthusiasm for quality circles (and 
their wide use in Japan), Japanese subsidiary plants in the West, 
generally, had not implemented them. Juran stated that quality circles, 
which he favored for their human relations benefits, could deal with the 
numerous small problems, but the major quality matters were outside the 
worker's sphere of influence (Schonberger, 1982}. 
Motivationalists had stressed that most people had a strong need to 
plan, organize, and control their work, and needed to have more of a 
participative input into matters that affected them on their jobs. 
However, not everyone had the ability, intelligence, or the experience, 
or for that matter the desire to engage in such functions (Stanton, 
1983}. 
Smither (1991) believed that there were no causes to assume that 
teamwork or quality circles in themselves would result in higher 
productivity or greater job satisfaction. While it was true that some 
leaders could make teamwork succeed among their subordinates, it was 
equally true that some workers would rather rely on their leaders, not 
their co-workers, for guidance on the job. 
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All too often, corporate leaders had read the success stories and 
ordained that their companies adopt work teams NOW. So perhaps, the 
first lesson needed to be that companies not plunge headfirst into this 
approach (Verespej, 1990b). 
Managers flocked to employee involvement for its promise of greater 
productivity, and by that standard, employee involvement has not 
delivered (Harrison, 1991). 
Smither (1991) stated that the secret was this: teamwork was out, 
authoritarian leadership was in. To the chagrin of some managers, and 
to the relief of others, evidence was accumulating that many of those 
quality circles, high performance teams, and autonomous work groups were 
not living up to expectations. Although researches in academia had 
suspected this for at .least ten years, only recently it had been 
depicted in the popular press. Just as American firms had tried to 
implement Japanese management systems, Honda had centralizing because 
they had grown too big for democracy and were charting a path that 
emphasized more individual responsibility (Chandler & Ingrassia, 1991). 
Grazier (1989) claimed that most businesses had been profitable and 
successful and believed that most Americans had enjoyed a reasonably 
comfortable standard of living. Because of that, he believed that there 
had been no motivation to change the way people worked and behaved in 
our society. 
The literature search confirmed that there was no consensus or 
clear cut data to substantiate that employee involvement systems 




The purpose of this study was to compare the level of performance 
of employee involvement teams to that of traditionally supervised 
employees doing the same type of work. This chapter includes the 
methodology used to design the study, collect, and analyze the data. 
The following sections include: (1) introduction, (2) population, (3) 
subjects, (4) the treatment-independent variable, (5) team dynamics, (6) 
research hypothesis, (7) type of research conducted, (8) data collection 
procedures, and (9) statistical analysis. 
Introduction 
The management of the study organization believed that the next 
great breakthrough in productivity required employee involvement. The 
subject organization had attained and maintained constant financial 
improvements, in excess of ten percent per year, during the last seven 
years. The leaders of this organization believed that in order to 
continue to be on the leading edge as a manufacturing entity and to 
remain competitive, more direct employee involvement was required. 
The employee involvement process began in August of 1989. The 
process put in place a plan to enact culture change, improve quality, 
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improve employee morale and improve productivity. The implementation 
plan that was enacted was seven to ten years in length. 
Population 
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There were approximately 3250 production employees in the total 
population with 2125 involved in this study. The study utilized one 
control group made up of 250 subjects and seven treatment groups made up 
of 1875. The seven treatment groups were combined into one group in 
order to achieve the parameters required for a valid statistical study. 
The employee involvement teams consisted of eight to thirty seven teams 
internally within each treatment group. 
There were 715 subjects excluded from the overall study because 
they worked on machine controlled operations, discontinued products, 
jobs that were being consolidated, or repair operations that were not 
rated. There were another 410 employees that had not received the 
treatment and thus were not included in the study. 
Therefore, the valid population consisted of 2535 
employees/subjects of which 410 were excluded because they had not 
received the treatment and were not required for additional control 
teams, an 84% employee participation rate when compared to the valid 
population. 
Selection Of Study Groups 
One hundred percent of the employees who received the treatment 
were included in the study, (1875 subjects). The treatment/training was 
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administered to the employees by group and the groups were selected for 
the training by organization number, lowest to highest. 
The control group of 250 subjects had been selected because they 
had not received treatment, were not considered to be a major problem 
area, had been running relatively on schedule, and the management of the 
overall organization believed that the control group's managers were 
sound and could be utilized for this study as the controlling entity. 
In summary, the study included 84% of the valid population (2125 
out of 2535 subjects). A more detailed presentation of the subject 
population was presented in Appendix C. 
The employee involvement teams were formed from people who attended 
the training class (treatment) and who volunteered to become involved 
members of the team. 
Prior to the inception of the employee involvement process, which 
began in August of 1989 and to the training, there were no employee 
involvement teams in the organization. 
The Treatment 
The training (treatment) was a five day workshop that dealt with 
team concepts, and culture required to support those concepts. It also 
put in place a process that allowed total voluntary involvement. 
Class participants were a mix of managers, engineers and 
operatives. After the basic courses, additional training was voluntary 
and included how to run a meeting, electronic mail, networking, problem 
solving methodology and awareness sessions. 
Training was needed to provide 1.) new job skills, 2.) team 
building, 3.) problem solving, 4.) conflict resolution, and 5.) 
communication skills. 
Supervisory training was deemed to be the most critical and 
therefore, over 60 hours of mandated courses relating to leadership, 
coaching, and empowerment was added to the basic treatment. 
Team Dynamics 
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The team was made-up of volunteers, usually six to twelve, who held 
short weekly meetings to improve their workplace quality and 
productivity. 
A leader and recorder were elected by the earn and the supervisor 
and engineer(s), as team members, met with the ~am to help the team 
expedite issues and improvements. 
A facilitator was assigned to each team. he facilitator 
participated with the team to insure the meetin' process, kept the team 
focused on workplace issues, nurtured the team'~ growth, and helped to 
expedite quality issues and improvements by overcoming roadblocks. 
The facilitator's role was to monitor, coach, and network. 
Facilitators were selected from supervision and engineering and major 
emphasis was placed on the facilitators being top performers. 
The team's purpose was to enact a culture change by developing and 
enhancing the skills of every employee. In addition, the team's goal was 
to involve the employees in decision-making and continuous improvement, 
to gain a strategic competitive advantage for the factory. 
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With proper implementation, it was believed that teams would be an 
important tool to reduce labor costs, make improvements in quality, 
improve productivity and morale, and create a sense of ownership and 
commitment to the product and to the workplace. 
The teams focused on the process, quality and safety. The teams 
did not address issues relating to company rules or the labor contract. 
Team members volunteered to start up an employee involvement team, 
after training had been completed. The team was self directed--the team 
elected their own leaders, chose the ideas or problems to work on, met 
for thirty minutes each week, and were allowed time outside of team 
meetings, during the standard work shift, to seek solutions. 
Team goals were to: 1.) provide a process of employee involvement 
that would reach 100% of the employees, 2.) empower employees to take 
responsibility and ownership of their processes and quality, 3.) enhance 
the quality of the entire factory, 4.) improve employee morale and 
attitude, 5.) achieve a competitive advantage for the factory, 6.) 
enhance the communication channels throughout the factory, and 7.) 
develop employee skill levels through training. 
A visible account of team progress was kept in the workplace on a 
flip chart and a history of the team's activity was kept by the 
recorder. The team usually only had six to eight open items, problems 
that they had addressed, at any given time and total employee 
involvement was achieved by allowing all employees an opportunity to 
participate on the team. 
86 
Research Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis was that there was no significant difference 
between the levels of performance of the employee involvement teams and 
those of traditionally supervised employees performing electronic 
assembly operations at a major manufacturing facility. 
Type of Research Conducted 
The study utilized a quasi-experimental design, a form of 
correlation research that resembles an experiment. Because of this 
resemblance, and unlike other forms of correlation design, conclusions 
can be drawn from the results (Abbott & Bordens, 1988). 
The main feature of quasi-experimental research was that it makes 
use of naturally occurring groups of subjects. Because naturally 
occuring groups were used, one does not randomly assign subjects to 
treatment conditions as one would in a true experiment. "The main 
difference between the true experiment and quasi-experiment was in the 
subject selection and assignment" (Abbott & Bordens, 1988, p. 161). 
This quasi-experiment utilized a time series design as suggested by 
Campbell and Stanley (1963). 
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In the time series design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963), one makes 
several observations (0) of behavior over time prior to and immediately 
after introducing the independent variable (X), the treatment. A 
contrast is then made between pre-intervention and post-intervention 
performance. 
The major problems associated with this type of design were related 
to internal validity. A partial solution to this type of problem was to 
include a control group in the quasi-experiment (Abbott & Bordens, 
1988), which was done in this study. 
Data Collection Procedures 
The study collected data from actual auditable accounting results 
that were generated by the study groups and the results were reported on 
a monthly, quarterly and yearly basis. The study was conducted over a 
two and a half year period, starting with the end of 1989. 
The dependent variables that were tracked and evaluated by the 
study consisted of variables that could be influenced, to some extent, 
by the employees in the groups. These variables were: 1.) labor 
productivity- a ratio that is based upon "should take" time compared 
against actual time it takes to accomplish the assigned task, 2.) 
results- a measure of total standard costs compared to actual incurred 
costs, 3.) work days lost (annualized), 4.) expense supplies, 5.) total 
group expenses, and 6.) a quality index- the ratio of customer standard 
quality compared to actual audited results. 
A more detailed explanation of the dependent variables follow: 
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1. Labor productivity- This metric was determined by comparing the 
actual time it takes to assemble products by the group, and comparing 
the actual incurred time to an established standard that has been 
predetermined by industrial engineers. The predetermined standard was 
established by time and motion studies, machine cycle times, and 
pre-established industrial engineering guidelines that have been refined 
since the Hawthorne studies. The actual calculation is made by placing 
the established standard time (the recovery hours) in the numerator and 
dividing by the actual incurred time (denominator) to produce the 
product. The resulting ratio is an efficiency percent that can be 
tracked and evaluated. It was expected that the groups would attain 
100%, however, it was important to track trends in addition to 
evaluating the absolute result obtained by the above productivity 
metric. 
2. Results- This metric could be viewed as a profit or loss 
evaluation. However, the results of this manufacturing entity were cost 
based and therefore, it was a comparison of the recovered standard costs 
to the incurred costs of producing the product. The resulting dollar 
number was either positive, indicating that it cost less to produce the 
products in question and that a positive dollar contribution was made to 
the business, or a negative number which would indicate that it has cost 
more to produce the product than the established standard. 
3. Work days lost (annualized)- A calculation of the number of 
sick absence days incurred during the period. This metric was evaluated 
because experts felt that employee involvement systems promote employee 
motivativation and interest, therefore, motivated employees have less 
occurrences of absence (Dulworth et al., 1990}. 
4. Expense supplies- Dollars associated with production that are 
expensed in the current accounting period. An example of items that 
were included in this variable were packing materials, solder, labels, 
and stationary items. It was believed that this was an item of cost 
that employee involvement groups would address and could impact. 
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5. Total group expenses- This variable included all of the 
expenses associated with production. The metric included expense 
supplies which were evaluated as part of this study, in addition to 
others associated with producing the product such as salaries and wages, 
depreciation and maintenance expense. 
6. Quality index- This was a comparison or ratio of incurred 
defects, workmanship or test, to established customer standards. The 
customer standards were established by industry studies and customer 
expectations based upon the technology utilized. It was expected that 
this metric would be below 1.00, which was considered standard quality. 
Statistical Analysis 
The study analyzed the six dependent variables before and after 
treatment and reached a conclusion about the effectiveness of employee 
involvement groups versus traditionally managed work groups. 
The study utilized one of the most widespread experimental designs 
in educational research, one that involves an experimental group and a 
control group both given a pre-test and post-test and one where groups 
constitute naturally assembled collectives (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). 
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The t-test was used to evaluate and compare the two groups, control 
and treatment. The t-test was selected because groups were the unit of 
measure not individual subjects. Also, the t-test can be used if there 
are an unequal number of subjects per group, as there are in this case 
(Abbott & Bordens, 1988). 
The chi-square analysis was also utilized to compare if 
differences exist between groups, as recommended by Witt (1985). 
A trend analysis or forecast was run using the time series data 
that was available from the study and it utilized a least squares and 
regression analysis approach. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this study was to compare the levels of performance 
of employee involvement teams to those of traditionally supervised 
employees doing the same work. 
This chapter is devoted to the presentation of the study findings. 
It is comprised of the following sections: (1) the description of the 
statistical techniques employed for analyzing the data, (2) analysis and 
results of the study, which were further broken down by descriptive 
statistics, hypothesis tests, and projections of future productivity, 
and (3) summary. 
Statistical Techniques Employed 
The study utilized a pre-test post-test control group design, as 
recommended by Campbell and Stanley (1963), and incorporated a 
quasi-experimental approach, which was dictated by the natural groups 
investigated by this study. 
The design dictated that, since groups had been the unit of measure 
in this study, and since the study contrasted differences between two 
groups, treatment and control, the "critical ratio" or t-test was the 
statistic of choice, in spite of the large individual sample size 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1963). 
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Parametric techniques provide a more powerful tool and approach 
than nonparametric statistics. The data and design parameters allowed 
the use of the t-test in this quasi-experiment. The t-test also enabled 
the researcher to evaluate differences between pairs of results in the 
time series design. 
In addition, a nonparametric evaluation was performed utilizing the 
chi-square statistic which evaluated the relationship and differences 
between the groups (Witt, 1985), and was utilized as a validity check 
against the results that were obtained. 
The statistical package that was used in this segment of the 
research was SPSS/PC+ STUDENTWARE PLUS (Norusis, 1991). 
The SAS Program projected future productivity trends and two 
distinct statistical methods were used to accomplish that task. The 
first was the STEPAR method which first fits a time trend model to the 
series and takes the difference between each value and the estimated 
trend. Then, the remaining variation is fit using an auto regressive 
model. The second, is the EXPO method, which uses exponential smoothing 
to generate the forecast. This approach weights the most recent data 
more heavily than the early data points (SAS Institute, 1988). 
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Analysis and Results-Descriptive Data 
Study Group Subjects 
The study group consisted of 2125 subjects. The subjects were 
further broken into a control group of 250 subjects and a treatment 
group of 1875 subjects. The study group was further separated by gender 
and presented in Table I. This analysis displayed a male population of 
thirty eight percent and a female population of sixty two percent. 
TABLE I 
STUDY GROUP GENDER ANALYSIS 
Group Male Female Total ------
A. 150 330 480 
c 89 171 260 
D 74 221 295 
G 67 108 175 
H 65 85 150 
K 96 164 260 
0 105 150 255 
TOTAL 
TREAT 646 1229 1875 
t of 
Total 34 66 100\ 
CONTROL 
GROUP 160 90 250 
t of 
Total 64 36 lOOt 
TOTAL 
STUDY GROUP 806 1319 2125 
t of 
Total 38 62 100\ 
The study group was then split by age groupings for further 
analysis. The overall matrix is presented in Table II and portrays an 
aging workforce with seventy six percent of the study group age forty 
one and over. 
TABLE I I 
STUDY PARTICIPANT AGE MATRIX 
Group >30 31-40 41-50 51+ Total 
-----
A 6 102 204 168 480 
c 6 66 98 90 260 
D 4 70 124 97 295 
G 4 47 77 47 175 
H 3 97 50 150 
M 5 80 117 58 260 
0 6 94 105 50 255 
TOTAL 
TREAT 31 462 822 560 1875 
t of 
Total 2 25 43 30 100% 
CONTROL 
GROUP 5 117 128 250 
% of 
Total 2 47 51 100% 
TOTAL 
STUDY 
GROUP 31 467 939 688 .2125 
% of 
Total 2 22 44 32 100% 
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The study group was also evaluated on the basis of Equal Employment 
Opportunity/Affirmative Action (EEO/AA) governmental categories. This 
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analysis pointed out that the two main ethnic backgrounds, as expected, 
were white and black accounting for eighty seven percent of the subjects 
in the study group and asians contributed another ten percent. This 
data is presented in Table III. 
TABLE II I 
ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTS BY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CODE 
TOTAL 
Group White Black Asian Indian Hispanic Total 
----- ----- ----- ----- ------ -------- -----
'• 
A 274 143 46 7 10 480 
c 145 76 35 4 260 
D 158 101 27 5 4 295 
G 95 46 27 1 6 175 
H 120 29 1 150 
M 141 63 46 2 8 260 
0 160 48 35 8 4 255 
TOTAL 
TREAT 1093 506 216 23 37 1875 
% of 
Total 58 27 12 1 2 100% 
CONTROL 
GROUP 216 27 1 3 3 250 
% of 
Total 87 11 1 1 lOOt 
TOTAL 
STUDY 
GROUP 1309 533 217 26 40 2125 
% of 
Total 62 25 10 1 2 100% 
Table IV analyzes the male subjects in the study group by 
affirmative action (AA) classification codes. It was observed that 
sixty six percent of the males in the study group were white and 
seventeen percent black. Asian males made up fourteen percent of the 
study group. 
TABLE IV 
ANALYSIS OF MALES BY AA CLASSIFICATION 
-------------------------------------------------------
Group Grade High Bus JC SmCol Col Mst Total 
A 6 388 9 33 35 7 2 480 
c 2 194 2 24 26 10 2 260 
0 218 4 25 44 4 295 
G 3 108 5 30 23 5 1 175 
H 96 28 26 150 
M 1 182 8 22 43 4 260 
0 158 12 35 45 5 255 
TOTAL 
TREAT 12 1344 40 197 242 35 5 1875 
% of 
Total 1 72 2 10 13 2 100% 
CONTROL 
GROUP 120 45 80 4 1 250 
% of 
Total 48 18 32 2 100% 
TOTAL --
STUDY 
GROUP 12 1464 40 242 322 39 6 2125 
% of 
Total 1 69 2 11 15 2 100% 
-------------------------------------------------------
The same analysis was performed for the females in the study group 




ANALYSIS OF FEMALES BY AA CLASSIFICATION 
-------------------------------------------------------
Group White Black Asian Indian Hispanic Total ------ --------
A 192 103 26 6 3 330 
c 92 59 18 2 171 
D 117 82 13 5 4 221 
G 63 33 9 1 2 108 
H 58 26 1 85 
M 83 49 26 1 5 164 
0 102 26 14 6 2 150 
TOTAL 
TREAT 707 378 106 19 19 1229 
t of 
Total 58 31 9 1 1 lOOt 
CONTROL 
GROUP 74 15 1 90 
t of 
Total 82 17 1 lOOt 
TOTAL 
STUDY 
GROUP 781 393 106 19 20 1319 
t of 
Total 59 30 8 1 2 lOOt 
-------------------------------------------------------
The female population was distributed differently with white 
females making up fifty nine percent and black females thirty percent of 
the study group. Asian females were a distant third with eight percent 
of the population. 
The final study group subject matrix evaluated the level of 
educational achievement. Table VI evaluated and displayed the levels of 
education achieved by the treatment groups and by the control group. 
Seventy percent of the study group had completed at least a high school 
program with another twenty eight percent having attended some college 
or business school. Further analysis was presented in the next table. 
TABLE VI 
LEVEL OF EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT BY STUDY GROUP 
-------------------------------------------------------
Group Grade High Bus JC SmCol Col Mst Total 
A 6 388 9 33 35 7 2 480 
c 2 194 2 24 26 10 2 260 
D 218 4 25 44 4 295 
G 3 108 5 30 23 5 1 175 
H 96 28 26 150 
M 1 182 8 22 43 4 260 
0 158 12 35 45 5 255 
TOTAL 
TREAT 12 1344 40 197 242 35 5 1875 
\ of 
TOtal 1 72 2 10 13 2 100\ 
CONTROL 
GROUP 120 45 
\ of 
80 4 1 250 
Total 48 18 32 2 100\ 
TOTAL 
STUDY 
GROUP 12 1464 40 
\ of 
242 322 39 6 2125 
Total 1 69 2 11 15 2 100\ 
Study Group Treatment Variables 
This section graphically portrayed the variables that were 
evaluated in the study. The actual data points are presented in 
Appendix D. Figure I deals with the main thesis of the study, 
productivity. The figure displayed the data points for the control and 
treatment groups and the plot points were for the pre-test and two 
post-test periods, which was the case in all of the variables that were 
analyzed in this section. 
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PRODUCTIVITY 




CJ CONTROL GRP ~ TREATMENT GRP 
Figure 1 
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The productivity index decreased for the control group in the 
post-test 1 period and maintained in the post-test 2 period. The 
treatment group's productivity increased slightly and fell substantially 
in the second post treatment period. 
The productivity index was further analyzed by removing treatment 
group A from the overall study due to the unique performance of that 
group, an "outlier" from all of the other study groups, including the 
control group. Further discussion will be presented on this phenomena 
in Chapter V. The resulting data is presented in Figure 2 below: 
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PRODUCTIVITY - ADJUSTED 




0 CONTROL GRP ~ TREATMENT GRP 
Figure 2 
After treatment group A was removed from the overall treatment 
group data, the results were completely different. The adjusted 
treatment group's productivity decreased substantially over the two 
post-treatment periods. 
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Profitability was the second variable that was evaluated by this 
study. The data for this variable were presented in Figure 3 and a 
complete discussion of the results were analyzed in the hypothesis part 
of this chapter as well as in the final summary. 
RESULTS 
TREATMENT vs. CONTROL GROUP 
POST•TEST1 POST·TEST2 
TIME PERIODS 
CJ CONTROL GRP ~TREATMENT GRP 
Figure 3 
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The control group did show a lot more volatility than the treatment 
group, yet, overall the mean results were comparable. 
Figure 4 presents the work days lost metric which was of interest 
because like productivity, it was a variable that could be linked 
directly to the individuals in the work groups, both control and 
treatment. 
WORK DAYS LOST (Annual) 




CJ CONTROL GRP ~ TREATMENT GRP 
Figure 4 
The work days lost statistic had different trend lines when 
comparing the control group to the treatment group. 
Figure 5 compares supplies expense and Figure 6 compares total 
expense between the control and treatment groups portrayed over the 
study cycle. 
EXPENSE SUPPLIES 










CJ CONTROL GRP ~ TREATMENT GRP 
Figure 5 
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The total expense evaluation combines all of the incurred expenses 
into an overall graph and does have common properties included from the 
prior expense categories. 
TOTAL EXPENSE DOLLARS 






CJ CONTROL GRP ~TREATMENT GRP 
Figure 6 
The trend was similar between the groups and an analysis was 
performed in the next section of this study as it pertains to total 
expenses. 
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The final variable that was evaluated by this study was the quality 
index and the differences over the study periods by the two groups. 
Figure 7 graphically presented the actual quality data that was recorded 
for the two study groups. 
QUALITY INDEX 






CJ CONTROL GRP ~TREATMENT GRP 
The quality performance of both groups, control and treatment, was 
much better than customer standard. 
Hypothesis Tests-Productivity 
The productivity variable was the major thrust of this study. 
Therefore, major emphasis was expended in evaluating this variable. 
Analysis - The t-test. 
The first analysis performed utilized the t-test and evaluated the 
actual results that were obtained by the control and treatment groups. 
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The resulting data was presented in Exhibit I and resulted in the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. As a reminder, the data points were 
all presented in Appendix D. 
EXHIBIT I 
T-TEST RESULTS-PRODUCTIVITY 
HO: Diff = 0 vs ALT@ Alpha= 0.05 
Computed t = 3.29794 
So reject HO. 
Sig. Level 0.0299913 
A multiple range analysis for productivity by group was also 
performed utilizing the Shaffe' at a ninety five percent confidence 
range, which also supported the conclusion that there was a difference. 
When analyzing the individual groups that comprised the treatment 
group it was observed that group A's performance was substantially 
different than the rest of the treatment groups, and therefore, was 
considered to be an "outlier". The t-test was rerun excluding Group A. 
The results were comparable to the prior test. 
EXHIBIT II 
T-TEST RESULTS-PRODUCTIVITY MODIFIED 
HO: Diff = 0 vs ALT @ Alpha = .05 
Computed t = 3.87354 
So reject HO. 
Sig. Level = 0.0179394 
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Since productivity was the major variable of this study, and was 
the basis for the original experiment, it was believed that all 
potential biases should be removed from the data. Therefore, the 
productivity data was converted to a comparable starting base of 100 and 
the changes were calculated from that base, an approach that was 
considered to be more powerful in this type of an experiment (Witt, 
1985). The conversion was also accomplished for the adjusted data that 
removed group A from the total treatment group's numbers. The t-test 
statistic was then run on the data, and the results are presented in 
Exhibit III. 
EXHIBIT III 
PRODUCTIVITY WITH DATA POINTS ADJUSTED TO 100 
Data Points: 
100 91 91 
100 101 92 
Computed t = -.89 Sig. level = .425 
df = 4 No significance 
EXHIBIT III (Cont.) 
Data Points Adjusted: 
100 91 91 Computed t = .000 Sig. level 1.00 
100 96 86 df = 4 No significance 
This approach resulted in no difference between the groups. 
Therefore, the hypothesis was not rejected. 
The last evaluation compared the productivity metrics between 
periods and groups. These data were evaluated at both the actual and 
adjusted basis. 
EXHIBIT VI 
PRODUCTIVITY BY PERIOD BY GROUP 
PERIOD 1 AND 2 
118 107 Computed t = 2.54 df = 2 
98 99 Sig. level = .127 NO significance 





Computed t = 3.00 df = 2 
Sig. level = .095 NO significance 
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EXHIBIT VI (Cont.) 
PRODUCTIVITY BY PERIOD BY GROUP-ADJUSTED 
PERIOD 1 AND 2 
118 107 Computed t = 3.26 df = 2 
95 94 Sig. level = .083 NO significance 





Computed t = 3.60 df = 2 
Sig. level = .069 NO significance 
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The above exhibit portrayed the data points used in the evaluation 
that compared the control group to the treatment group and compared 
period one (pre-test) to period two (post-testl), and then period two 
(post-test1) to period three (post-test2). 
This evaluation was also a more powerful approach than just the 
standard t-test since it evaluated change between groups and periods, 
and has also been called a correlated t-test (Witt, 1985). The 
evaluation did not result in a finding of significance. 
Analysis - Chi-square 
As a verification and back-up for the analysis performed earlier, 
the chi-square test was utilized. The initial analysis used the base 
data and the adjusted productivity data when group A was removed from 
the treatment results. The findings were shown in Exhibit 5. There was 
a positive correlation between the groups and therefore, there was no 
major difference between the two groups. 
---------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT V 
PRODUCTIVITY CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
Value df 
98 118 Pearson .33457 2 
99 107 Likelihood .33439 2 
91 107 Mantel-Haenszel .01799 1 




















The likelihood ratio tested for the independence between groups and 
productivity results and the Mantel-Haenszel for linear association. 
The data was then adjusted to a base of 100 and the chi-square 
statistic was run for the base data and then again for the adjusted data 
which excluded Group A. The results again agreed with the null 
hypothesis that there was no significant difference between the 
treatment and control group. The results are presented below: 
EXHIBIT VI 
PRODUCTIVITY (BASE 100) CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
Value df Sign if. 
100 100 Pearson .31598 2 .85386 
101 91 Likelihood .31608 2 .85382 
92 91 Mantel-Haenszel .00459 1 .94601 
PRODUCTIVITY (BASE 100-ADJ) CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
100 100 Pearson .27493 2 . 87156 
96 91 Likelihood .27495 2 
86 91 Mantel-Haenszel .06636 1 
Hypothesis Tests-Results 
The variable examined in this section pertained to the 
profitability comparison between the two groups. 




The t-test results are presented in the next exhibit. There was 
not a significant difference between the groups and therefore, the null 
was not rejected. The multiple range analysis at a ninety five percent 
Scheffe' also backed up this recommendation. 
EXHIBIT VII 
T-TEST RESULTS-PROFITABILITY 
HO: Diff = 0 vs ALT@ Alpha= 0.05 
Computed t = 0.413149 
So do NOT reject HO. 
Sig. Level 0.969025 
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A t-test was also run comparing changes from one period to the next 
by group. However, because there was no significance, no further 
discussion will take place in the body of this study. 
Hypothesis Tests-Work Days Lost (Annualized) 
This variable was one that the subjects had direct input to by 
their actions. It was a measure of behavior and therefore, one that 
could be impacted by treatment, if worker involvement does in fact 
increase performance. 
Analysis - The t-test 
The t-test compared the treatment group to the control group and 
the resulting metric recommended rejection of the null hypothesis. See 
Exhibit VIII for the actual t-test statistics. 
EXHIBIT VI I I 
T-TEST RESULTS - WORK DAYS LOST 
HO: Diff = 0 vs ALT@ Alpha= 0.05 
Computed t = -3.81751 
So reject HO. 
Sig. Level = 0.0188184 
The multiple range analysis at a ninety five percent confidence 
rate for the Scheffe' concurred with the above recommendation. 
Analysis - Chi-square 
The chi-square statistic was performed on the data and it 
substantiated the t-test result. 
---------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT IX 
WORK DAYS LOST CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
Value df Sign if. 
17 8 Pearson .98861 2 .60999 
17 14 Likelihood .98399 2 . 61140 
18 10 Mantel-Haenszel .02247 1 .88084 
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The data reflected that there was not a strong correlation between 
the groups for work days lost, therefore, the null hypothesis was 
suspect for this variable. 
Hypothesis Tests-Expense Supplies 
This variable was one that could be somewhat impacted by employee 
involvement systems and therefore, an analysis was performed on the 
actual performance of the control and treatment groups. 
Analysis - The t-test 
The t-test statistic was run comparing the control group to the 
treatment group. The results indicated a recommendation to not reject 
the null hypothesis at a ninety five percent confidence interval. 
EXHIBIT X 
T-TEST RESULTS - EXPENSE SUPPLIES 
HO: Diff = 0 vs All @Alpha = 0.05 
Computed t = -0.172774 
So DO NOT reject HO. 
Sig. Level = 0.871219 
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Analysis - Chi-square 
The chi-square analysis did not provide a strong back-up to the 
null hypothesis in this case as portrayed by the results listed below in 
Exhibit XI. 
EXHIBIT XI 
EXPENSE SUPPLIES CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
Value df 








Likelihood .58504 2 .74638 
Mantel-Haenszel .57552 1 .44808 
Hypothesis Tests-Total Expense 
This variable consisted of total expense dollars expended to 
support required production. While the employee involvement teams could 
not impact totally on this metric, this researcher believed that the 
treatment group could have some impact on the overall results. 
Analysis - The t-test 
The data was analyzed utilizing this statistic and it resulted in a 
recommendation to not reject the null hypothesis. 
EXHIBIT XII 
T-TEST RESULTS - TOTAL EXPENSE 
HO: Diff = 0 vs ALT@ Alpha= 0.05 
Computed t = 1.89535 
So DO NOT reject HO. 
Sig. Level = 0.130939 
Analysis - Chi-square 
The chi-square statistic did not show strong correlation between 
the two groups as evidenced by the data generated by this statistic. 
EXHIBIT XIII 
TOTAL EXPENSE CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
Value df Signif. 
279 300 Pearson 2.80442 2 .24605 
291 377 Likelihood 2.80177 2 






The last variable that was evaluated was quality performance. This 
variable can be directly impacted by employee involvement initiatives. 
Analysis - The t-test 
The t-test analysis resulted in a recommendation to reject the null 
hypothesis. However, this significance could have been the result of 
the base starting points being so diverse. The data was adjusted to a 
base of 100 and the t-test was rerun from a common starting point. The 
results are presented in Exhibit XIV. 
EXHIBIT XIV 
T-TEST RESULTS - QUALITY 
ACTUAL DATA: 
HO: Diff = 0 vs ALT@ Alpha= 0.05 
Computed t = 25.4912 Sig. Level = 1.4065E-5 
So reject HO. 
DATA ADJUSTED TO BASE OF 100: 
HO: Diff = 0 vs ALT @ Alpha = 0.05 
Computed t = -1.18 
So DO NOT reject HO. 
Sig. Level = .305 
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Analysis - Chi-sguare 
The analysis that was performed substantiated the null hypothesis 
that there was not a major difference between the treatment and control 
groups for this variable. 
---------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT XV 
QUALITY CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS 
.27 .67 Pearson .21559 2 .89781 
.31 .67 Likelihood .21473 2 .89820 
.27 .65 Mantel-Haenszel .00915 1 .92378 
As this statistic pointed out, there was a strong correlation 
between the treatment and control group and validated the above 
findings. 
Productivity Projections 
The SAS program was used to forecast future periods for both the 
treatment and control groups (SAS Institute, 1988). The two techniques, 
exponential smoothing and autoregression, both did not show any trend, 
rather they projected a relatively flat line in the future. Figure 8 
graphically depicts the forecast using these methods and Table VII 
presents the same data in a numerical format. 
PRODUCTIVITY PROJECTION 
TREATMENT VS CONTROL GROUP 
PRODUCTIVITY INDEX 
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TABLE VII 


































EXPO utilizes single exponential smoothing technique 
AUTO utilizes the stepwise autoregressive technique 




A least squares regression line was also calculated. The results 
of that calculation resulted in a very slight difference in the slope of 
the line when projected into future periods. The least squares 
calculation resulted in the following negative trend projection: 
EXHIBIT XVI 
LEAST SQUARES TREND LINE 
CONTROL GROUP: Y = 114.9 - 1.9x 
TREATMENT GROUP: Y = 101.1 - 1.7x 
Summary 
This chapter included a description of the statistical methods 
employed, analysis of the resulting data for the six study variables, 
and a forecast of the productivity variable into future periods. 
There was significant differences between the groups on three of 
the study variables on the initial t-test analysis. However, after 
further analysis and investigation, it was determined that only work 
days lost resulted in a significant difference between groups. An 
indepth discussion of the study findings will be conducted in the next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to compare the levels of performance 
of employee involvement teams to those of traditionally supervised 
employees doing the same work. This chapter presents the summary, 
conclusions, recommendations for practice, recommendations for further 
research, and the implications of the study. 
Summary 
Many successful large companies were not generally implementing 
participative management methods. Grazier (1989) believed that since 
these companies were doing relatively well and that since the standard 
of living was acceptable, there was no motivation or need to change. 
The current management literature was replete with unsubstantiated 
claims that participative management and employee involvement were the 
keys to increasing productivity (Baloff & Doherty, 1990), (Dulworth et 
al., 1990), (Penzer, 1991), and (Saporito, 1986). 
There were other experts who believed just the opposite, and 
actually stated that employee involvement systems had no or a perverse 
effect on productivity and performance (Harrison, 1991), (Marrow, 1975), 
(Miller, 1991), and (Stanton, 1983). 
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The problem which gave rise to this study was the inadequacy of 
research which established that employee involvement systems contributed 
to increased productivity or performance. The literature search also 
pointed out the need for more empirical evidence. 
The study compared the performance of two groups, one which 
followed employee involvement practices and the other traditional 
management practices, against six variables in a pretest post-test 
quasi-experimental design. The study was conducted in a large 
manufacturing entity, over a two and a half year period, in a field 
environment, and involved 2125 subjects. The study utilized at-test 
and chi-square analysis. 
It was expected that productivity in employee involvement plants 
would be thirty to forty percent higher than in traditionally managed 
ones (Garwood, 1990). By this metric, the treatment group failed to 
perform. 
It was expected that employee involvement practices would increase 
productivity, motivation, and job satisfaction, and decrease absenteeism 
(Baloff & Doherty, 1990) and (Dulworth et al., 1990). 
There was no significant difference between levels of performance 
of employee involvement teams and traditionally supervised ones. In the 
final analysis, there was only one variable of six that showed a 
significant difference between groups. That variable was work days 
lost, and there the difference was negatively correlated, i.e., the 
control group performed better than the treatment group, contrary to 
expectations espoused by the experts. 
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However, Group H displayed even greater improvement than the 
control group and exhibited a tendency toward fewer days lost than the 
balance of the study groups. The population of Group H consisted of 9% 
more males than the overall treatment population, 98% of their 
population was over 41 as opposed to 73% for the treatment group, and 
80% were of Caucasian background versus 58% for the balance of the 
treatment group. In addition, 36% of group H achieved some college or 
junior college experience versus 25% for the treatment group. 
Group H was comparable to the Control Group in age, had 21% fewer 
males, was 7% less Caucasian, and had 16% less college or junior college 
experience than the Control Group. These demographics were in direct 
contrast to the treatment population and therefore, no conclusions could 
be made without further study. 
The initial t-test evaluation that was performed on the 
productivity index resulted in a finding of a significant difference 
between the control and treatment group ( t= 3.298, p<.05 ). However, 
as discussed in Chapter IV, further evaluation resulted in no 
significant difference between the groups when the data were evaluated 
on a common base. Furthermore, when projecting the productivity of the 
control and treatment groups into future periods, there was no 
significant difference in performance between the treatment and control 
groups. 
Group A performed in direct contrast to the control and treatment 
groups on the productivity index. Group A was the largest of the 
entities making up the treatment group. However, the population of the 
group closely mirrored the total treatment group, other than in 
educational achievement, where Group A had 10% fewer subjects who 
attended classes beyond high school. 
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The leader of group A is the top rated manager at the study 
location. This fact combined with sound employee involvement practices 
could account for the superior performance of Group A. 
The quality index evaluation resulted in a recommendation to reject 
the null hypothesis. However, when the researcher adjusted the study 
variable to a common base of 100, there was no significant difference 
between the groups. 
The other three variables that were evaluated: results, expense 
supplies, and total expenses, all resulted in no significant differences 
between the control and treatment groups and therefore, the null 
hypothesis was not rejected. 
Conclusions 
Based upon the findings, there was no difference between the 
productivity and performance of employee involvement groups and 
traditionally managed organizations. Perhaps the real difference in 
performance was caused by the management practices of the group leaders, 
as indicated by the study results of Group A. 
It should be recognized that the findings could be affected by the 
length of the study period not being at least five to ten years in 
duration. If the study continued, perhaps the performance of the 
employee involvement teams would end up to be different from the 
traditionally managed teams. 
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The trainers and facilitators were top performers, but were not 
evaluated during the study and could have contributed negatively to the 
performance of the employee involvement teams. 
The control group consisted of employees that were not well 
respected by their peers or management. They were 11 mavericks .. and 
worked in an .. end of the line .. operation where they could control the 
fate of the total organization. The researcher considered it 
significant that the employee involvement teams did not perform better 
than the control group, a group that clearly relished its role of being 
powerful and troublesome. 
The study results do not contradict prior studies as discussed in 
the literature search. However, there are other studies that have 
reached the opposite conclusion. 
Employee involvement teams have made a difference in prior studies, 
and intuitively should contribute to increased performance in the long 
term. However, in the final analysis, employee involvement teams did 
not perform better than the traditionally managed ones in the study. The 
role of the existing culture at the organization could have contributed 
to this lack of increased performance as well as the length of the 
study. 
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Recommendations for Practice 
The organization should continue to implement employee involvement 
practices because experts believe that successful implementation 
requires five to ten years (Dumaine, 1990a), (Hannah, 1990), and 
(Collitti, 1986) and as long as the process was not counter-productive 
it should be continued. 
The initial approach by this organization was to gain employee 
trust and participation. The next step should be to increase the 
employee's responsibilities and to give the employee involvement groups 
more autonomy for decision making and self regulation. 
Management participation appeared to be adequate. However, it is 
recommended that additional training be provided, and mandated if 
necessary, to further the employee involvement process and to help 
managers in the transition from cop to leader. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
The study should be continued into future periods to evaluate 
whether increased experience and time with employee involvement systems 
do in fact enhance productivity. 
The study should also evaluate the effects individual leaders, both 
managers and facilitators, have on performance. 
Group A's productivity performance should be evaluated to determine 
what variables caused their performance to be superior to all other 
groups in this study. 
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Group H's superior performance on decreased absenteeism needs to be 
understood and emulated for future application. 
Implications 
Managers of tomorrow must be able to get people to commit 
themselves to the business in order for the business to be successful 
(Dumaine, 1989). Work teams have been a positive way of fostering 
employee involvement and possibly commitment (Schonberger, 1982). 
The study did not find any correlation between employee involvement 
practices and increased employee productivity and performance. 
The only desirable correlation appears to be between the study 
variables and good management/leaders. 
Perhaps if this organization had been smaller and could have hired 
employees that did not have prior cultural expectations, the study 
results could have been different. This approach would have resulted in 
subjects having no prior built in biases and hiring could have been 
based on team compatability, a required skill set, and educational 
requirements. 
In addition, the union environment and the rigid rules associated 
with the labor contract could have effected the outcome of the study. 
The employee involvement teams were not allowed to address items covered 
in the union contract such as work rules and peer subject's lack of 
performance. 
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The short length of time over which the study was conducted, two 
and one half years, could have contributed to the non difference between 
the treatment and control groups. 
The study results indicate that employee involvement team 
performance was not different from traditionally supervised employees 
performing the same type of work. In fact, there were some indications 
that productivity might be better where top managers are leading the 
organizations, regardless of whether the groups utilize employee 
involvement practices or the more traditional approaches. 
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HISTORY OF THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS AND SYSTEM 
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In 1798, fearing a war with France, the United States 
awarded a contract to Eli Whitney to produce 10,000 muskets rapidly. 
Production of muskets through gunsmiths was a slow process because each 
musket was produced one at a time. Eli came up with an assembly line 
approach where each employee built one part to specification and passed 
it on. This was the first process that utilized standardized and 
interchangeable parts. Eli Whitney is considered the father of the 
"System of Mass Production" in this country (Grazier, 1990). 
This system had obvious benefits. According to Grazier (1990), it 
brought dramatically increased methods of production, resulting in lower 
more affordable prices. But, there was a negative effect that was 
overshadowed by the benefits, and has gone virtually unnoticed until this 
century. As opposed to the worker/gunsmith having a challenging task of 
producing the entire musket, he now had a much smaller task which was 
repeated over and over again--a task that required little thinking. In 
effect, Grazier stated, this approach had begun to draw the worker away 
from the thinking process of his job. 
About 100 years later, Grazier reported, that Henry Ford carried the 
process one step further with the concept of the moving assembly line. 
Frederick Taylor refined this process more and actually began to define 
the roles of management and labor. Taylor was occupied with concepts 
that would increase production in manufacturing. He dealt with the 
concept of time studies and organizing and streamlining the production 
flow. His principles of "scientific management" became widely accepted. 
Management was quick to adopt these remedies because relationships with 
labor were generally poor in the late 1800's. Taylor's scientific 
approach permitted them to deal with the work flow procedures and 
equipment improvements rather than the more complex issues of employee 
commitment and morale. Taylor believed that the .,experts., solved 
problems in organizations and that management was the .,thinker., and 
labor's role was one of .,doer... Although this approach is patently 
archaic in today's society, most of the work in the United States is 
still performed using this philosophy (Grazier, 1990). 
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If the company had continued doing business the way they had always 
done--even though that had gotten them where they are today--it might not 
be enough to compete in the future. Steelcase's management believed that 
they had to start involving the people more and fully utilize their 
people's talents. The five principles of Steelcase's program are: 
Quality, faster throughput, elimination of waste, a product-group focus 
(or focused factories), and employee involvement. Nearly 90% of the 
firm's 5,400 Grand Rapids-area employees have been organized into 560 
teams. The teams receive eight hours of training in world class 
manufacturing (WCM) concepts, as well as training in the seven principles 
of problem solving. They made work-team participation mandatory at the 
factory. Customer lead-times were reduced from 12 weeks to six. 
Increase in work-in-process turns from 22 a year to 35, despite a 73% 
increase in the number of parts used. Manufacturing cycle reduced to an 
average of five days--compared with 25 to 30 in a traditional plant. 
Total savings were $1.2 million in a little over a year (Sheridan, 1990). 
The Wizards of Buick City 
It took five years before Buick City could brag about its 
world-class quality levels, an achievement that came in the midst of an 
incredible amount of change: four different plant managers, a change in 
the UAW plant leadership, introduction of massive doses of technology, 
introduction of a whole new manufacturing process (including Just-In-Time 
manufacturing) and introduction of a pay-for-knowledge system that 
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replaced the senority system. Instead of hundreds of job 
classifications, the plant now has three; finally, the introduction of 
the team approach and use of participative management, instead of the 
dictatorial approach. There are no bosses at Buick City, only 
counterparts. There is one parking lot for all employees, and other 
barriers are tossed out as they are discovered. The results speak for 
themselves. Since Buick City began production in 1985, its problems per 
hundred cars have decreased by 44%. Warranty costs have been reduced 59% 
for the first 30 days of ownership between 1986 and 1989. Discrepencies 
per car in the first 30 days has dropped by 77% since the 1986 model 
year. Assembly hours per car have dropped 23% since 1985. Absenteeism 
down to less than 2%--a 40% improvement (Moskal, 1990). (It should be 
noted that this was a new plant/facility.) 
Citizens Gas and Coke Utility 
A 103-year-old firm, located in Indianapolis, has improved its 
operations over the last four years with a total quality effort built 
upon employee teams addressing important issues confronting the company 
and focusing on a customer satisfaction process (Lindemann, 1990). 
Payback: a new suggestion system has generated more usable 
suggestions in a-year-and-a-half than the old system in 35 years. Since 
1986, grievances are down 63%, arbitrations are down 45%, and labor 
related legal costs are 40% down. Overall customer favorability ratings 
have progressed from 65% in 1987 to 71%, and 76% in '88 and '89. Quality 
audits have risen from a low of 52% in 1987, to above 85% in 1989 and 
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1990. lost time injuries in the manufacturing division have decreased 
from 8.6 in 1985, to 2.6 in 1989 per 200,000 hours. The secret of 
success with teams is due to five factors: 1.) Team building is not an 
end to itself, 2.) management leads by example, 3.) teams which deal with 
issues need to be chartered and advised, 4.) team performance improves if 
the team is allowed to have fun through means such as coming up with 
original names, slogans, skits, etc., and 5.) recognition of team 
performance is crucial (Lindemann, 1990). 
ORYX Energy Company 
Oryx Energy Company of Dallas, an independent oil and gas producer 
that has total assets of over $4 billion and proven oil reserves of 1 
billion barrels, has established a unique approach to the relationships 
between worker and bosses. It has gone from an operation swamped in 
paperwork and procedures into a dynamic elite organization that utilizes 
"natural work teams." The teams unearthed problems, brainstormed them, 
and developed solutions (Rohan, 1990). 
After two years the results are starting to show: the quantifiable 
ones come to about $75 million a year. The largest chunk (about $45 
million) is in payroll, because there are now fewer layers of management 
and nearly 1000 fewer employees. Another $15 million is being saved 
through better field operation, and $15 million more is being realized 
through better management of contractor services at the well sites 
(Rohan, 1990}. 
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Eastman Kodak Company 
Eastman has discovered a novel way to turn an ailing manufacturing 
operation around: Put the hourly workers in charge. Ralph Olney, a 
Kodak Division manager did just that in "Room 13," a Kodak operation that 
manufactures professional film. Olney eliminated the five levels of 
management between himself and the floor personnel. He gave the hourly 
employees the .power to make purchasing decisions, start and stop the 
assembly lines, and design equipment to meet their needs, not 
management's. The improved operating results were evident immediatelly. 
In 1988, Room 13 ran about $1 million over its $30 million budget. In 
1989, with the workers in charge, the unit came in $1.5 million under 
budget, and so far this year, they are running $600,000 below target. The 
percent of finished goods with zero defects jumped from 75% to 99%. "We 
must improve quality and you can't do that without empowering your 
people," says Kay Whitmore, Kodak CEO. "You have to get rid of the 
managerial infrastructure that historically was put in to control people 
(Hillkirk, 1990a, p. 48)." Whitmore stated that about 10% of Kodak 
Divisions are heavily involved in this approach with another 30-40% 
starting to mimic it. Not all want to work in this type of environment 
and have opted for reassignment (Hillkirk, 1990a). 
Kodak's changes have posted roller-coaster financial results and the 
jury is still deliberating whether the restructuring and resizing have 
had the desired effect on bottom line results per a current Wall Street 
Journal article (Rigdon, 1992). 
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Dana Corporation 
Two strategies were paramount: A streamlined JIT system built 
around manufacturing cells, and a heavy reliance on a team structure. 
The teams are primarily self-directed. They elect their own team 
captains and tackle various continuous-improvement projects-- including 
set-up reduction, preventative maintenance, and adopting KANBAN systems. 
It took about a year for the team training to have a real bottom-line 
impact. Results became evident after approximately 50% to 60% of the 
people were trained. But the training did pay at least one early 
dividend--workers began contributing ideas to improve the original 
work-cell design (Sheridan, 1990). 
In the last three years, the 330-employee plant, which makes 
hydraulic control valves, has reduced manufacturing through-put time 92%, 
increased productivity 32%, trimmed customer leadtime from 6 months to 6 
weeks, consolidated two plants into one-- producing comparable output in 
half the manufacturing space, boosted on-time delivery to the 95% range, 
pared quality costs by 47%, trimmed total inventory 50%, and improved 
return on investment 470%, and return on sales of 320% (Sheridan, 1990). 
Toledo Scale 
The emphasis these days is on self-managed work teams and a 
"pay-for-skills" program that encorages cross training (Sheridan, 1990). 
To get the required effect and benefit from work cells throughout 
the factory; flexibility through cross training, and a willingness to 
learn new skills are mandatory. This approach has included the following 
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payoffs: there were dramatic reductions in throughput time. For example, 
two weeks to three days for the (PCB) Printed Circuit Board area, a 
reduction of 67% in the (WIP) work in process inventory, an 85% drop in 
defect rates in the PCB line, on-time delivery in the 99% range, and a 
24% increase in productivity in the first two years based on value of 
shipments per employee (Sheridan, 1990). 
Westinghouse Commercial Nuclear Fuels Division 
This winner of the first National Malcom Baldrige Quality Award, 
believes that total quality is a way of doing business--an all 
encompassing strategy for creating value for customers, stockholders, 
employees and community. Total quality recognizes that excellence 
requires a commitment to continuous quality improvement in every facet of 
running the business. A total quality culture requires excellent, highly 
trained and motivated people who take pride in their work, who are 
committed to continuous improvement, and who embrace new ideas. 
Participation through quality improvement teams is the cornerstone of 
human resource excellence (Commercial Nuclear Fuels Division-Westinghouse 
[CNFD-W], 1989). Major accomplishments were: A significant improvement 
in product reliablility --from 99.95% to 99.995%--in three years and 
rapidly approaching 99.9995%; 100% on-time shipments since 1985; 
improvement in once-through yield rates for fuel tubing of over 16 
percentage points in four years; continuous increase in on-time and 
error-free software from 90% to over 98% in three years; a 30% reduction 
in total quality costs as a percent of sales in four years due to reduced 
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rework and scrap costs; and winning the Malcom Baldrige National Quality 
Award. Westinghouse took initiatives in 3 areas: training, participation 
and motivation (CNFD-W, 1989). "The team approach was the key to success, 
not good management" L~~_lag, 1990) . 
Others 
Ten years ago there were practically no superteams. Only a handful 
of companies--Proctor & Gamble, Digital Equipment, and TRW, to name a 
few--were experimenting with them. But a recent survey of 476 FORTUNE 
1,000 companies, published by the American Productivity & Quality Center 
in Houston, shows that while only 7% of the work force is organized in 
self-managed teams, half the companies questioned say that they will be 
relying significantly more on them in the years ahead. Those who have 
taken the plunge have seen impressive results: 
*The General Mills plant in Lodi, California runs with no second 
shift supervision. 
*A team of Federal Express employees spotted and solved a billing 
problem that was costing the company $2.1 million a year. 
* 3M cross functional teams tripled the number of new products. 
*Aetna Life and Casualty reduced the ratio of middle managers to 
workers from one to seven down to one to thirty--all while improving 
customer service. 
* Teams at Johnsonville Sausage have increased production by 50% 
since 1986 which helped the CEO make the decision to have a major 
expansion (Dumaine, 1990b). 
APPENDIX C 
STUDY POPULATION DESCRIPTION 
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ON ROLL 





































































TREATMENT GROUP - Store, Assembly 
EXCLUDED - Being Discontinued 
TREATMENT GROUP - Assembly oper. 
TREATMENT GROUP - Assembly oper. 
EXCLUDED - Machine controlled oper. 
EXCLUDED - Had not rec'd treatment. 
TREATMENT GROUP - Assembly oper. 
TREATMENT GROUP - Testing operation 
EXCLUDED - Had not rec'd treatment 
EXCLUDED - Being discontinued 
EXCLUDED - Repair oper. Not rated 
EXCLUDED - Had not rec'd treatment 
TREATMENT GROUP - Assembly oper. 
CONTROL GROUP - Testing operation 
TREATMENT GROUP - Assembly oper. 
EXCLUDED - Product consolidation 
TOTAL POPULATION 
EXCLUDED - Machine controlled, 
discontinued, repair-not rated, 
being consolidated. 
VALID POPULATION FOR STUDY 
EXCLUDED-Had not rec'd treatment 
STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
PARTICIPANTS/VALID POPULATION 
* 100% of the groups that received TREATMENT are 
participating in this study. 
APPENDIX D 
STUDY DATA POINTS 
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PRODUCTIVITY WORK DAYS 
GROUP PERIOD ORIG ADJ RESULTS LOST (ANN) 
----- ------ ------- ----------
CONTROL PRE 118 118 990 8.3 
POST1 107 107 174 13.9 
POST2 107 107 735 10.1 
TREATMENT PRE 98 95 595 16.8 
POST1 99 94 667 16.9 
POST2 91 84 607 18.3 
EXPENSE CONF TOTAL QUALITY 
GROUP PERIOD SUPPLIES COSTS EXPENSE INDEX 
----- ------ -------- ----- ------- -------
CONTROL PRE 27 186 300 .67 
POST1 33 237 377 .67 
POST2 26 148 302 .65 
TREATMENT PRE 32 64 279 .27 
POST1 33 75 291 .31 
POST2 23 54 245 .27 
The treatment group is a weighted average of the seven 
treatment groups. 
APPENDIX E 
STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS 
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[PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSihl]_ _________________________________________________ _ 





Difference between Keans = 14,6667 
conf. Interval For Diff. in Wean•l 
(£qual Var•.) Sample 1 - Sample 2 
(Unequal Vars,) Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Ratio of Variances = 2.12281 
118 107 107 98 " u Pooled 
3 3 ' 110.667 " 10l.l33 co. 3333 1t n.un 
'. 35085 4,3SU 5.4U71 
107 .,. 103 
95 PerceDt 
2.31482 27.0185 4 D.P. 
1,6634 27.66'' 3.5 D.P. 
Conf. Interval for Ratio of Variance•l 0 
Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Percent 
~ypothesis Teat for HOI Diff = 0 
VII Altl Hl 
at Alpha = 0.05 
Computed t statistic = 3.29794 
Sig. Level = 0.02~9913 
so reject HO. 
Wultiple ra~ge analysis for prodty by group 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Method: 95 Percent Scheff• 














Di!terence betveeD Wean• = 1t.6667 
Conf. Interval For Diff. in Wean•s 
(Equal Var•.) Sample 1 - Sampl• 2 
(Unequal Var•.) Sampl• 1.- Sample 2 
Ratio of Variance• = 1.0900t 





















Conf. Interval for Ratio of VarlaDc:e•a 0 
Sampl• 1 - Sample 2 
PerceDt 
Hypothesi• Test !or HOI Piff = 0 
v• Alta Hl 
at Alpha = 0.01 
Computed t 1tatistic = 3.8735C 
Slg. Level = 0.017,3tC 
so reject HO. 
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Two·Sample Analysis Results .. -. ·- .... "' .... -.... -.-.---- .. ---- ........ -.--- ........ -... -.. . 
. . 100 91 91 100 101·;;···;~~i~d···· 
Sample Statistics: Number of Obs. 3 3 6 
Average 94 97.6661 95.8333 
Variance ~7 24.3333 25, 6667 
Std. Deviation 5.19615 4.93288 5.06623 
Median 91 100 96 
Difference between Means • -3.66667 
Cont. Interval For Diff. in Means: 
(Equal Vars.) Sample 1 • Sample 2 
(Unequal Vars.) Sample 1 · Sample 2 






Cont. Interval for Ratio of Variances: 0 
Sample 1 - Sample ~ 
Percent 
Hypothesis Test for HO: Di!f • 0 
VB Alt: NB 
·at Alpha • 0.05 
Computed t statistic • ·0.886405 
Sig. Level • 0.425477 
so do not reject HO. 
Two-Sample Analysis Results 
-------------------------·--------------------·----------------------------· 





Difference between Means • 0 
Conf. Interval For Diff. in Means: 
(Equal Vars.) Sample 1 • Sample 2 
(Unequal Vars.) Sample 1 • Sample 2 
Ratio of Variances • 0.519231 























Cont. Interval for Ratio of Variances: 0 
Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Percent 
Hypothesis Test for HO: Diff • 0 
VS Alt: NB 
at Alpha • 0.05 
Computed t statistic • 0 
Sig. Level • 1 
so do not reject HO. 
SPSS/PC+ Studentware+ 
t-tests for independent samples of GROUP Group 
variable 
Number 
ot Cases Mean 
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SD SE ot Mean 












Mean Difference • 1.4000 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F=7.2E+18 ~ .000 
t-test for Equality of Means 
variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq SE of Dif! 
95t 





























SE of Mean 
.ooo 
.400 ---------------------------------------------------------------
Mean Difference • 1.2000 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F~ • pa • 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq SE of Dift 
95t 
CI for Diff -----------------------------------------------------------------------Equal 3.00 2 ,095 .400 (-.521, 2.921) 
Unequal 3.00 1.00 .205 .400 (-3.882, 6.282) -----------------------------------------------------------------------
SPSS/PC+ Studentware+ 
t-tests tor independent samples of GROUP Group 
Variable 
Number 
of Cases Mean 
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so SE of Mean 












Mean Difference • 1.8000 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F=7,2E+18 P= .000 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq SE of Diff 
95\ 
















t-tests for independent samples of GROUP Group 
Variable 
Number 
of Cases Mean so SE of Mean 












Mean Difference • 1.8000 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= • P= • 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq SE of Diff 
95\ 

















PERIOD Page 1 of 1 
E~u~!1 1 PRE POSTl POST2 
Residual Rov 
-------- ____ ::~~1----~:~~l----~:~~! Total 
1
::: l~:~lil~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~l!!~~~ :~::: 
Column 213 201 191 605 
Total 35.2t 33.2t 31.6\ lOO.Ot 
Chi-Square Value OF Significance 
-------------------- ----------- ------------
Pearson .34355 2 .84217 
Likelihood Ratio .34330 2 




Minimum Expected Frequency - 86.187 
GROUP 
PERIOD Page 1 of 1 
E~u~;l JPRE . POSTl POST2 
Residual Rov 
-------- ____ ::~~!----~:~~!----~:~~! Total 
.oo 1 100 I 101 I .2 1 ,., 
1
.oo 1~:~iil~~I~~~:~~~~I~~~i~i~~1 ::;;; 
Column 200 192 183 575 
Total 34.8t 33.4t 31.St lOO.ot 
Chi-Square Value OF Significance 
-------------------- ----------- ------------
Pearson .31598 2 
.85386 
Likelihood Ratio .31608 2 
.85382 
Mantel-Haenszel test for .00459 1 
.94601 
linear association 
Minimum Expected Frequency - 89.750 
GROUP 
SPSS/PC+ studentware+ 
PERIOD Page 1 of 1 
E~~u~:l JPRB POSTl POST2 
Residual Row 
-------- ____ ::~~!----~:~~!----~:~~! Total 
• 00 1 100 1 96 1 86 1 282 
-~~::~-- --~~:~-- --~~:~-- so.ot 
•• oo 1_~:~I; __ 1--~~I~--1--~!I~--l 5.~~: 
Column 200 187 177 564 
Total 35.5t 33.2t 31.4t lOO.Ot 
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Minimum Expected Frequency - 88.500 
[ PROFITABILITYij 













Difference between Weans = 10 
conf. Interval For Diff. in Weansa 
(Equal Vars.) Sample 1 - Sample 2 
(Unequal Vars.) Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Ratio of Variances a 117.115 









Conf. Interval tor latio of Variance•: 0 









Hypothesis Test for BO: Diff = 0 
v• Alt: HI: 
at Alpha = o.o5 
Computed t etatietic = 0.0413141 
Sig. Level = O.t6t025 
eo do not re~ect BO. 
Wultiple ranse analyst• for eult• by group 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Wethocl: fS Percent Scheff• 
Level Count Average Bomoseneous Groups 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 3 623.00000 • 
l 3 633.00000 • 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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{lwoRK DAYS LOSTl Two-Sample Analysi• Result• 
·---------------------------------------------------------
GROUP 





Difference between Wean• = -6.56117 
conf. Interval For Diff. in Me•n•l 
(Equal Var•.) Sample 1 - Sample 2 
(Unequal Var•.) Sample 1 - Sample Z 
Ratio of Variance• = 11.6201 
Sample 1 Sample Z Pooled 
3 3 I 
10.7167 17.3333 14.05 
8.17333 0.703333 4,43833 
2.8581 0.13815 2.10174 






Conf. Interval for Ratio of Variance•: 0 
Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Percent 
Hypothesi• Teet for BO: Diff = 0 
VII Alt: Nl: 
at Alpha = 0.05 
Computed t statistic = -3.81751 
Sig, Level = 0.0188184 
so reject RO. 
Multiple range analysis for lost by group 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Method: 95 Percent Scheff• 



























Mantel-Haenszel test for 
linear association 












(( EXPENSE SUPPLI E"sD 
Two-Sample Analyei• Reeulta 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GROUP 























Difference between Mean• = -0.6666'7 
con£. Interval For Diff. in Mean•t 
(Equal Var•.J Sample 1 -Sample 2 





Ratio of Variance• = 0.472527 
con£. Interval for Ratio of Variances: 0 
Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Percent 
Hypothesi• Teet for BOI Diff = 0 
vs Alt: NC 
at Alpha :a 0.05 
Computed t statistic = -0.172774 
sig. Level = 0.87121t 
eo do not reject HO. 
Multiple range analyst• for cost by group 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Method: 95 Percent Scheff• 
tevel Count Average Homogeneous Croup• 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 3 28.666667 * 
2 3 2t.J33333 • 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PERIOD Page 1 ot 1 
E~u~~l JPRE POST1 POST2 
Residual · Row 
-------- ----~:~~!----~:~~!----=:~~! Total 
• 00 l 3 2 I 33 I 23 I .. 
l.OO l~~~~~i~~I~~~~i~~~I~~;:~i~~I ~::;; 
Column 59 66 49 174 
Total 33.9' 37.9' 28.2' 100.0' 
Chi-Square Value DF -------------------- ----------- Significance ------------
Pearson .58449 2 • 74659 Likelihood Ratio .58504 2 .74638 Mantel-Haenszel test for .57552 1 .44808 linear association 










Difference between Keane = 54.6617 
Conf. Interval For Di!f. in Neanel 
(Equal Vars.) Sample 1 - Sample 2 
(Unequal Vars.) Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Ratio of Variances = 3.3834t 
300 377 302 zn zu 2U Pooled 
3 3 ' 326.333 271.U7 2tt 
1926.33 5U.333 1247.13 
43.U 23.8607 35.3247 
302 27J a5.5 
95 Perceftt 
-25.4413 134.775 4 D.P. 
-35.673 145.001 3.1 D.P. 
conf. Interval for Ratio of Variance•: 0 
Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Perceftt 
Hypothesis Test !or BO: Iliff = 0 
VS Alt: HI: 
at Alpha = 0,05 
Computed t statiatic = 1.89535 
Sig, Level = O.l3093t 
so do not reject BO. 
Multiple range analyst• for expse by group 
. ;:;;~;;~-;;-;:;~:~;-;~;;:;;;------------------------------------------------------
Level Count Average Homogeneous Croupe 
-;-----------;-----;;~~~;;~;---;------------------------------------------------








45 • .U 
1794 
100.0\ 












Mantel-Haenszel test for 
linear association 
Minimum Expected Frequency 248.498 
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frQUALITY INDEXII 
Two-Sample Analysis Result• 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sample statistics: Number of Ob•• 
Average 
Variance 
.n .n .u 
J 




















Conf. Interval For Diff. ill Weall81 
(Equal Var•.) Sample 1 -Sample 2 





Ratio of Variance• = 0,25 
Conf, Interval for Ratio of Variance•• 0 
Sample 1 - Sample 2 
Percent 
Hypothesis Test {or RO: Diff = 0 
V8 Alt: HI: 
at Alpha = o.os 
Computed t statistic = 2S.t912 
Sig. Level = 1.4065311:-S 
eo reject BO. 
Wultiple range analysis for qual by group 
-----------------------------------------------------------------· Wethod: 95 Percent Scheffe 
Level CoUAt Average Romogeneou• Croup• 
-----------------------------------------------------------------· 2 3 .2833333 • 
1 3 .6633333 • 
-----------------------------------------------------------------· 
SPSS/PC+ Studentware+ 
t-tests for independent samples of GROUP Group 
Variable 
Nwnber 
of Cases Mean SD SE of Mean 












Mean Difference • -6.0000 
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 9.846 P. .035 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Variances t-value df 2-Tail Siq SE of Diff 
95t 
















PERIOD Paqe 1 of 1 
E~~u~:l ]PRE POSTl POST2 
Residual Rov 
-------- ----~:~~l----~:~~1----~:~~! Total 
.oo j __ :!~!--1--~~~!--l--~=~~--1 ... :~ 
1. 00 1 67 1 67 1 65 l 199 
--~!~! __ --~~:~-- --~~:~-- 70.1\ 
Coluli\J\ 94 98 92 284 
Total 33.1t 34.5\ 32.4\ 100,0\ 
Chi-Square Value DF 
-------------------- -----------
Pearson .21559 2 
Likelihood Ratio • 21473 2 
Mantel-Haenszel test for .00915 1 
linear association 
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